Magnusson, Erik2020-03-182019Magnusson E. How to reject Benatar’s asymmetry argument. Bioethics. 2019 Apr 23;33(6):674-83. DOI: 10.1111/bioe.125820269-9702http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43932In this paper, I reconsider David Benatar’s primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument— and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part I by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts II-IV to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part V by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar’s overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar’s anti-natalist conclusion; it is also unnecessary as well.application/pdfengThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Magnusson E. How to reject Benatar’s asymmetry argument. Bioethics. 2019 Apr 23:1-10., which has been published in final form at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12582. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12582Anti-natalismAsymmetry argumentQuality of life argumentDavid BenatarProcreative ethicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess