Ippolito, FilippoPeydró, José-LuisPolo, Andrea, 1983-Sette, EnricoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252015-11-01Journal of Financial Economics, 122(1): 135-154, October 2016http://hdl.handle.net/10230/25229By providing liquidity to depositors and credit-line borrowers, banks can be exposed to double-runs on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, credit-line drawdowns are not larger for banks more exposed to the interbank market; however, they are larger when we condition on the same firms with multiple credit lines. We show that, ex-ante, more exposed banks actively manage their liquidity risk by granting fewer credit lines to firms that run more during crises.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons