Breitenstein, SofiaHernández, Enrique2024-09-302024-09-302024Breitenstein S, Hernández E. Too crooked to be good? Trade-offs in the electoral punishment of malfeasance and corruption. Eur J Polit Sci Rev. 2024 Sep 12. DOI: 10.1017/S175577392400016X1755-7739http://hdl.handle.net/10230/61267Data de publicació electrònica: 12-09-2024While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians’ competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters’ priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens’ support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public’s unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day.application/pdfeng© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained prior to any commercial use.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175577392400016XCorruptionMalfeasanceAccountabilityVoteSurvey experimentCompetenceTrade-offinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess