Eeckhout, JanKircher, Philipp Albert Theodor2016-02-222016-02-222010Eeckhout J, Kircher P. Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. J Econ Theory. 2010;145(4):1354-85.0022-0531http://hdl.handle.net/10230/25920In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer’s meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions.application/pdfeng© Elsevier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005PreusCompetència econòmica -- Models matemàticsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005Competing Mechanism DesignMatching FunctionMeeting FunctionSortingScreeningPrice PostingAuctionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess