Daley, BrendanGreen, BrettVanasco, Victoria2021-10-012020Daley B, Green B, Vanasco V. Securitization, ratings, and credit supply. Journal of Finance. 2020 Apr;75(2):1037-82. DOI: 10.1111/jofi.128660022-1082http://hdl.handle.net/10230/48548Includes supplementary materials for the online appendixWe develop a framework to explore the effect of credit ratings on loan origination. We show that ratings endogenously shift the economy from a signaling equilibrium, in which banks inefficiently retain loans to signal quality, toward an originate-to-distribute equilibrium with zero retention and inefficiently low lending standards. Ratings increase overall efficiency, provided that the reduction in costly retention more than compensates for the origination of some negative net present value loans. We study how banks' ability to screen loans affects these predictions and use the model to analyze commonly proposed policies such as mandatory “skin in the game.”application/pdfengThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Daley B, Green B, Vanasco V. Securitization, ratings, and credit supply. Journal of Finance. 2020 Apr;75(2):1037-82. DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12866, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12866. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.Anàlisi de ràtiosCrèditsPréstecs bancarisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12866info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess