Germano, FabrizioLugosi, GáborUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252005-10-01Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578http://hdl.handle.net/10230/551We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPapercorrelated equilibriumfinite gamesMicroeconomicsStatistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methodsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess