van Damme, EricHurkens, SjaakUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-262001-11-01Games and Economic Behavior 47, 404-20, 2004http://hdl.handle.net/10230/500We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperprice leadershipendogenous timingrisk dominanceMicroeconomicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess