Akin, OzlemColeman, Nicholas S.Fons-Rosen, ChristianPeydró, José-LuisUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2024-11-142024-11-142016-10-01Financial Management, 50(3), 2021, pp. 619-644http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27418We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically-connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsPolitical connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARPinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperpolitical connectionspolitical economy in bankinginsider tradingtarpbank bailoutsBusiness Economics and Industrial OrganizationFinance and AccountingLabour, Public, Development and Health Economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess