Daniels, Lesley-Ann2020-04-012020-04-012020Daniels LA. How and when amnesty during conflict affects conflict termination. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2020 Oct;64(9):1612-37. DOI: 10.1177/00220027209098840022-0027http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44139In the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a cross-national dataset of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty’s strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution.application/pdfengDaniels Lesley-Ann, How and when amnesty during conflict affects conflict termination, Journal of Conflict Resolution. Copyright © 2020 SAGE Pulications. DOI: 10.1177/0022002720909884info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002720909884Civil warAmnestyConflict terminationBargainingTransitional justiceCommitment problemsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess