Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Litschig, StephanUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2008-08-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsAre rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazilinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperLabour, Public, Development and Health Economicsbureaucracyinstitutionsredistributive politicselectoral competitioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess