Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín2024-07-022023Verdejo VM. On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action. Philos Explor. 2023;26(3):324-42. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.21750211386-9795http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60634Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others.application/pdfeng© This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations on 27 Feb 2023, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021Bodily selfDeafferentationFirst personThird personSelf-conceptinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess