Monti, Ezequiel2024-01-082024-01-082023Monti E. Are there any conventional obligations?. Legal theory. 2023;29(2):90-121. DOI: 10.1017/S13523252230000711352-3252http://hdl.handle.net/10230/58623There are reasons to believe that conventional obligations are impossible. Thus, it could be argued that for me to have an obligation to Φ in virtue of the fact that a convention so requires, it must be the case that I have a convention-independent obligation to do something else such that, given the existence of the convention, Φing is a way of doing just that. But, then, my obligation to Φ would not really be conventional at all. On closer inspection, so-called conventional obligations turn out to be no more than a specification of what our nonconventional obligations require given the circumstances. In this paper, I shall argue that contra to what this argument suggests, there can be genuinely conventional obligations. To do so, I develop a second-personal account of conventional obligations, according to which obligations are grounded by conventions in virtue of an explanation that does not follow the indicated pattern.application/pdfengThis is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Pressinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325223000071info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess