Ayres, JoãoNavarro, GastonNicolini, Juan PabloTeles, Pedro2018-04-252018-04-252018-02http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34458In the standard model of sovereign default, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) or Arellano (2008), default is driven by fundamentals alone. There is no independent role for expectations. We show that small variations of that model are consistent with multiple interest rate equilibria, similar to the ones found in Calvo (1988). For distributions of output that are commonly used in the literature, the high interest rate equilibria have properties that make them fragile. Once output is drawn from a distribution with both good and bad times, however, it is possible to have robust high interest rate equilibria.application/pdfengThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.Sovereign default: the role of expectationsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperSovereign defaultMultiple equilibriaGood and bad timesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess