Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín2024-03-072024-03-072020Verdejo VM. Rip van Winkle and the retention of ‘today’-belief: a puzzle. Res Philosophica. 2020 Jul;97(3):459-69. DOI: 10.11612/resphil.19252168-9105http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59350Can a subject who expresses a belief with ‘today’ on a given day, and subsequently loses track of time, retain and re-express that belief on a future, potentially distant day? Since Kaplan’s tentative remarks on Rip Van Winkle, it has become popular to answer this question in the positive. However, a remarkably simple variation of the Rip Van Winkle story can show that this kind of view leads to a puzzling dilemma: either subjects cannot re-express a belief with utterances of ‘today’ on the same day, or else they may rationally exhibit conflicting stances toward the same ‘today’-belief. This result may be seen as supporting the claim that retention of ‘today’-belief over time requires the tracking of days. Yet it may also spur further research into the capacities involved in belief retention and re-expression to solve the puzzle.application/pdfeng© 2020 Víctor M. Verdejo © 2020 Res Philosophica.Van Winkle, Rip (Personatge de ficció) -- Crítica i interpretacióTempsFuturinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1925info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess