Vriend, Nicolaas J.Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261996-10-01Economics Letters, 55, No. 1, 9-18, 1997http://hdl.handle.net/10230/449Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperultimatum gamegame theoryreasoningreinforcement learningleexMicroeconomicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess