Olsaretti, Serena2018-03-262017Olsaretti S. Liberal equality and the moral status of parent-child relationships. In: Sobel D, Vallentyne P, Wall S, editors. Oxford studies in political philosophy, volume 3. New York: Oxford University Press; 2017. p. 58-83.9780198801221http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34260The family, and in particular the parent-child relationship that constitutes its core, is attracting increasing attention among political philosophers. Contemporary theorists of justice, who, until a couple of decades ago, either neglected the family or saw its relevance mostly in light of its being a site of gender injustice, are now addressing a host of questions about the structure and role of the family in a just society (Macleod 2002; Clayton 2006; Archard 2010a; Brighouse and Swift 2014). One such question is whether and why in a just society there should be parent-child relationships (or the family) at all. Tackling it head on, a few liberal egalitarian philosophers now defend the family by appealing to the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship for both parents and children alike (Macleod 2002, 2010; Brighouse and Swift 2009, 2014). They claim that this defense of the family accounts for some of the prerogatives and responsibilities that are often seen to characterize the parent- child relationship, while at the same time showing others to be unwarranted. In particular, this “relationship view” aims to give support to parents’ having rights over their children, including the right to exercise some discretion about how to raise them (compatibly with their respecting children’s claims). It also aims to show that some parental partiality is justified— namely, the kind of partiality that is integral to the valuable parent-child relationship. The relationship view thus addresses two challenges that the justification of the family raises for liberal egalitarians: the problem of authority and the problem of partiality. These two challenges point, respectively, to the burdens of justifying to children their parents’ having rights over them, and to third parties parents’ favoring of their children in ways that disrupt equality. This paper asks whether the relationship view succeeds in meeting these challenges. It suggests that it does not fully do that: the relationship view does not capture some important convictions about the moral status of the parent-child relationship and, as a result, it does not fully address the two stated challenges. The paper also offers an alternative basis for justifying the parent-child relationship on which parents, by virtue of being morally responsible for their children’s existence, have an obligation to enter a relationship with them. Section 1 outlines the challenges of authority and of partiality in more detail. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the main claims of the relationship view, by contrasting it with those made by the instrumental view of the family, and identify its main shortcomings. Section 4 presents my alternative view, on which those who are morally responsible for a child’s existence have an obligation to enter and sustain a caring relationship with that child.application/pdfeng© the several contributors 2017. The moral rights of the contributors have been asserted. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropiate reptrographics rights organization. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.Ciències polítiques -- Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPartinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess