Arruñada, BenitoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252000-01-01Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 92, 2nd and 3rd trimesters, (2000), pp. 277-96. Reprinted in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds.), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 337-57http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1142The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperretailingdistributioncontractstransaction costsself-enforcementBusiness Economics and Industrial Organizationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess