Galadí, Javier Alejandro2024-06-252024-06-252023Galadí JA. What I am and what I am not: destruktion of the mind–body problem. Philosophies. 2023 Nov 21;8(6):110. DOI: 10.3390/philosophies80601102409-9287http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60565The German word destruktion is used here in the sense that philosophy should destroy some ontological concepts and the everyday meanings of certain words. Tradition allows the transmission of knowledge, but it can perpetuate certain prejudices. According to Heidegger, tradition transmits, but it also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence and prevents us from accessing the origin of concepts. It makes us believe that we do not need to return to that origin. Making tradition transparent dissolves the concealments it has provoked. Here, I apply this idea to the mind–body problem, which has inherited occultations that are born from Descartes himself. As a result, a new philosophical framework for research on consciousness emerges: that, as an individual cognitive being, I cannot avoid splitting reality into what I am and what I am not, extending then the individual duality to a collective error transmitted culturally.application/pdfeng© 2023 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060110Mind–body problemConsciousnessDestruktionHard problemHeideggerDescartesNagelZombiesBeingIndexical conceptsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess