Bird, DanielFrug, AlexanderUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252020-01-20http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44762Workers rarely perform exactly the same tasks every day. Instead, their daily workload may change randomly over time to comply with the uctuating needs of the organiza- tion where they are employed. In this paper, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking eect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker's tasks is sucient to gen- erate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsOptimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks<resourceType xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" resourceTypeGeneral="Other">info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</resourceType><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">dynamic contracting</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">random tasks</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">seniority</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">promotion.</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">Microeconomics</subject><rights xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3">info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</rights>