Saint Paul, GillesUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261999-11-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1227Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we observe such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in a forthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred for further details.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsToward a theory of labor market institutionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperpolitical economylabor market institutionsunemploymentMacroeconomics and International Economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess