Akın, ÖzlemColeman, Nicholas S.Fons‐Rosen, ChristianPeydró, José-Luis2019-12-182021Akin O, Coleman NS, Fons‐Rosen C, Peydró J‐L. Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP. Financ Manage. 2021;50(3):619-44. DOI: 10.1111/fima.122920046-3892http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43201We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically‐connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.application/pdfeng© 2019 The Authors. Financial Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Financial Management Association International. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292Political connectionsPolitical economy in bankingInsider tradingTARPBank bailoutsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess