Motta, MassimoShelegia, Sandro2025-06-302025-06-302024Motta M, Shelegia S. The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat. J Econ Manag Strategy. 2024 Sep 23. DOI: 10.1111/jems.126141058-6407http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70799Data de publicació electrònica: 23-09-2024A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an 'ex ante' effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the 'kill zone') and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions.application/pdfengThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.info:eu-repo/semantics/article2025-06-30http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12614InnovationKill zonePlatforminfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess