Pérez, Lluís (Pérez Lozano)2021-12-132021-12-132021Pérez-Lozano L. An imperfect firewall: Quebec’s constitutional right of secession as a device against domination. Politics and Governance. 2021;9(4):475-82. DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i4.45692183-2463http://hdl.handle.net/10230/49183The idea of including a right of secession in democratic constitutions has been discussed by different political and legal theorists; however, little has been said on the matter from the point of view of democratic-republican political philosophy. This article undertakes this effort by means of a normative analysis of Quebec’s constitutional right of secession, as outlined in the Quebec Secession Reference. This analysis shows how the non-unilateral nature of this right minimises the risks for republican freedom (as non-domination) and inclusion in the Quebec secession conflict, while the fact that it is limited to a national constitutional framework dampens this achievement.application/pdfeng© Lluís Pérez-Lozano. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction of the work without further permission provided the original author(s) and source are credited.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4569CanadaConstitutionalismDemocracyDominationFactionsQuebecRepublicanismSecessioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess