Gossner, OlivierUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-251996-05-01Games and Economic Behavior, num. 30, pp. 44-63, 2000http://hdl.handle.net/10230/596We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and ${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when for every compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ induced by ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say that ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$ when all the players can compute from their information in ${\cal I}$ ``new information'' that they could have received from ${\cal J}$. We prove that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ if and only if ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPapergame--theoryinformationcorrelationMicroeconomicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess