Ollár, MariannPenta, Antonio2023-07-112023-07-112023Ollár M, Penta A. A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions. Rev Econ Stud. 2023;90(5):2517-54. DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac0840034-6527http://hdl.handle.net/10230/57530We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. First, we characterize all incentive compatible transfers under these assumptions. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, that only elicit payoff relevant information, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The full implementation results obtain from showing that the problem can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to suitable constraints which are dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements.application/pdfeng© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivs licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals. permissions@oup.cominfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac084Robust full implementationRationalizabilityInterdependent valuesIdentical but unknown distributionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess