Garcia Montalvo, JoséPiolatto, AmedeoRaya, Josep M.Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252019-03-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44800We model the behaviour of a buyer trying to evade the real estate transfer tax. We identify over-appraisal as a key, easily-observable element that is inversely related with tax evasion. We conclude that the tax authority could focus auditing eorts on low-appraisal transactions. We include `behavioural'components (shame and stigma) allowing to introduce buyers'(education) and societal (social capital) characteristics that explain individual and idiosyncratic variations.Our empirical analysis conrms the predictions using a unique database, where we directly observe: real payment, value declared to the authority,appraisal, buyers' educational level and local levels of corruption and trust.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsTransaction-tax evasion in the housing marketinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPapertransfer taxtax evasionsecond-hand housing marketoverappraisalloan-to-valuecorruptionsocial capitalstigmashameeducationStatistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methodsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess