Escribà-Folch, AbelBöhmelt, TobiasPilster, Ulrich2021-03-152021-03-152020Escribà-Folch A, Böhmelt T, Pilster U. Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2020;37(5):559-79. DOI: 10.1177/07388942198362850738-8942http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46774Includes supplemental material for the online appendixHow do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.application/pdfengEscribà-Folch A, Böhmelt T, Pilster U, Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies, Conflict Management and Peace Science (Volume: 37 issue: 5) pp. 559-79. Copyright © 2019 SAGE Publications. DOI: 10.1177/0738894219836285.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285AutocraciesCivil–military relationsCounterbalancingCoup-proofingQuantitative analysisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess