Wright, Joseph (Joseph George), 1976-Escribà-Folch, Abel2021-06-162021-06-162011Wright J, Escribà-Folch A. Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy. Br J Polit Sci. 2011 Sep 26;42(2):283-309. DOI: 10.1017/S00071234110003170007-1234http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47907This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization.application/pdfeng© Cambridge University Press. The published version of the article: Wright J, Escribà-Folch A. Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy. Br J Polit Sci. 2011 Sep 26;42(2):283-309 is available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000317info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000317info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess