Appendix A: Structure and payoffs used in the game and the experimental protocol; distributions of Player 1s' decisions in different games.

Structure and payoffs used in the game

Most survey programmes, such as the 'World Value Survey', use the same question to measure social trust, asking subjects whether "most people can be trusted". There have been some attempts to improve this with new scales. However, this way of measuring social trust presents several problems. Some studies have pointed out that trust questions are generic in that they do not make any reference to a group or issue at stake.[1] This can make it difficult to understand what people have in mind when formulating their answers and some studies have shown that respondents may refer to different circles of people when doing so (e.g. Miller and Mitamura 2003; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Delhey et al. 2011). However, the main strength of surveys is that they allow information about attitudes and social conditions to be collected by means of population samples at the individual level.

Another approach relies on the use of the experimental method, implementing specific trust games which provide behavioural measures and more clearly frame the type of situation, the stakes and the actors involved in the interaction (e.g. Camerer 2003; Ostrom and Walker 2003). In this case, the main inconvenience is that experiments often rely on self-selected students as subjects, with a resulting problem of external validity. Thus, in order to benefit from both approaches, we follow seminal research (Fehr et al. 2003) and we combine behavioural experiments with the survey method. In this way, it is possible to obtain data from behavioural measures of trust and observe the effects of specific treatments on subset of subjects drawn from national samples.[2]

To elicit behavioural trust towards strangers, we employ an adapted version of the one-shot trust game designed by Berg et al. (1995). The game is a sequence of moves between two actors where both are fully informed about its structure and payoffs. This is played by two randomly assigned anonymous players who do not know each other before participating in the game and neither do they exchange any information during its implementation. Ermisch et al. (2009) claim that this form of the trust game omits important facets of trust and they offer a new framework based on binary decisions. Nevertheless, we decided to employ the classic form to increase the comparability of our results with previous research on the topic (for a review, see Wilson and Eckel, 2011).

A word should be added on the validity of the method employed to gauge generalized trust (Levitt and List, 2007; Morton and Williams 2010). The first thing to notice is that the game fits our conceptualization of trust. In fact, when Player 1 decides to trust, he/she also accepts the risk of being exploited by Player 2. Furthermore, even though behaviour in the game is not associated with common survey-based trust questions, it correlates highly with most questions on trust in strangers, suggesting the game is a more refined tool to elicit this type of other-regarding preference towards unknown people (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr et al., 2003; Ermisch et al. 2009). Last, before starting the experiment subjects were given a series of questions on payoff calculations and understanding.

Regarding external validity, unlike other research employing the same game, our experiment was conducted on a broader population than the usual student samples. Moreover, the levels of generalized trust in our experiments are in line with those from other studies in different countries. In their meta-analysis of 162 trust games based on the work by Berg et al. (1995) and implemented on students and non-student samples, Johnson and Mislin (2011) show that in Europe the proportion of the endowment sent by Player 1s ranges between 0.22 and 0.78, with a mean of 0.53 and a standard deviation of 0.12. In our anonymous game, on average the Player 1s sent a proportion between 0.52 and 0.64 across the two waves. The value is within a standard deviation of that mean, confirming the reliability of the results. Finally, the use of web surveys may have also facilitated the collection of sensitive information and in this way increased the accuracy of people's answers and behaviours (Kreuter et al., 2008).

Figure A1. The structure of the game and payoffs used in the experiment.

The experimental protocol

Sample Experimental Instrument for Spain[3]

The game order was randomized. Subjects played the role of Player 1 (Truster) or Player 2 (Trustee), but not both. The treatments (game information) varied between the two countries but the general game wording and structure did not.

Player 1 general instructions

Description

Thank you for participating in today's study. We are interested in how people form and interpret social preferences. In order to answer this question, we are asking you to take a short online survey. You will be asked to play a series of quick online social games followed by a series of questions regarding your background and preferences. This survey will take about 25 minutes. Approximately 1000 people from Spain will participate in the study. To start with, you will participate in a game with other people that we will assign to you randomly. You will not interact with them personally. Moreover, you will not know their identity and neither will they know yours. The person you will be assigned to lives in Spain.

Next screen

In this game, there are two players: ‘Player 1’ and ‘Player 2’. You are Player 1. Player 2, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the survey (neither will that person be told who you are). The game has the following characteristics:

1. You will have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of your 5 NetQuest points to Player 2.
2. Whatever amount you send to Player 2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2.
3. You must decide how many points (if any) you will send to Player 2. Any amount you keep for yourself will be given to you.
4. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to you.
5. Player 2 will end up with the points you send to him/her (if any) plus the initial endowment, minus those points he returns to you (if any).
6. You will end up with the points you kept plus those points Player 2 returns to you (if you decide to send him/her any).
7. At this point, the game is over.

Next screen

To clarify how this game works, consider the following examples:

If you	Player 2	If Player 2	You receive:	Player 2 receives: (5 + #
0 points	0 points	0 points	5 - 0 + 0 = 5 points	5 + 0 = 5 points
1 points	3 points	2 points	5 - 1 + 2 = 6 points	5 + 3 - 2 = 6 points
3 points	9 points	0 points	5 - 3 + 0 = 2 points	5 + 9 - 0 = 14 points
3 points	9 points	9 points	5 - 3 + 9 = 11 points	5 + 9 - 9 = 14 points
5 points	15 points	7 points	5 - 5 + 7 = 7 points	5 + 15 - 7 = 13 points

Next screen

Did you understand the game?

- Yes
- No

Next screen

Please let us ask some questions in order to test it: Let us assume that you send 5 NetQuest points to the other player. How many points will the other player receive?

- 5
- 15

- 20

Next screen

Let us assume that the other player returns 15 NetQuest points to you. How many points will you end up with when the game is over?

- 5
- 15
- 13

Next screen

Game 1: INSTRUCTIONS

Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, please select the amount from the options below that you want to send to Player 2 and advance to the next game. You will not know the person you will be playing with (neither will the other person know you). Player 2, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study.

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

Next screen

Game 2: INSTRUCTIONS

This game is played the same way as the first game. Like the previous game, in this game there are two players: ‘Player 1’ and ‘Player 3’. You are Player 1. Player 3, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the survey (neither will that person be told who you are). We have chosen to give you one piece of information about Player 3:

Player 3 identifies politically with the PSOE.

Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, select the amount from the options below and advance to the next game.

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3

- 4
- 5

Next screen

Game 3: INSTRUCTIONS

This game is played the same way as the first game. Like the previous game, in this game there are two players: ‘Player 1’ and ‘Player 4’. You are Player 1. Player 4, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the survey (neither will that person be told who you are). We have chosen to give you one piece of information about Player 3:

Player 4 identifies politically with the PP.

Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, select the amount from the options below and advance to the next game.

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

[***]

Player 2 general instructions

Description

Thank you for participating in today’s study. We are interested in how people form and interpret social preferences. In order to answer this question, we are asking you to take a short online survey. You will be asked to play a series of quick online social games followed by a series of questions regarding your background and preferences. This survey will take about 25 minutes. Approximately 1000 people from Spain will participate in the study. To start with, you will participate in a game with other people that we will assign to you randomly. You will not interact with them personally. Moreover, you will not know their identity and neither will they know yours. The person you will be assigned to lives in Spain.

Next screen

In this game, there are two players: you and ‘Player 1’. Player 1, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the survey (neither will that person be told who you are). The game has the following characteristics:

1. Player 1 will have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of his/her 5 NetQuest points to you.
2. Whatever amount Player 1 sends you will be tripled before it is passed on.
3. You must decide how many points (if any) you will return to Player 1.
4. Player 1 will end up with the points you will return to him/her (if any), plus the initial endowment, minus the points he sent you (if any).
5. You will end up with the initial endowment plus the points Player 1 sent you (if he/she decides to send you any) minus the points you returned to him/her (if any).
6. At this point, the game is over.

Next screen

To clarify how this game works, consider the following examples:

If Player 1	You receive:	If you return:	Player 1 receives:	You receive: (5 + #
0 points	0 points	0 points	5 - 0 + 0 = 5 points	5 + 0 = 5 points
1 points	3 points	2 points	5 - 1 + 2 = 6 points	5 + 3 - 2 = 6 points
3 points	9 points	0 points	5 - 3 + 0 = 2 points	5 + 9 – 0 = 14 points
3 points	9 points	9 points	5 – 3 + 9 = 11 points	5 + 9 - 9 = 5 points
5 points	15 points	7 points	5 - 5 + 7 = 7 points	5 + 15 - 7 = 13 points

Next screen

Did you understand the game?

- Yes
- No

Next screen

Please let us ask some questions in order to test it: Let us assume that you send 5 NetQuest points to the other player. How many points will the other player receive?

- 5
- 15
- 20

Next screen

Let us assume that the other player returns 15 NetQuest points to you. How many points will you end up with when the game is over?

- 5
- 15

- 13

Next screen

Game 1: INSTRUCTIONS

Player 1 elected to give you X NetQuest points. We tripled the amount so that you will receive X*3.

Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, please select the amount from the options below that you want to return (if any) from the total you received from Player 1 and advance to the next game. You will not know the person you will be playing with (neither will the other person know you). Player 1, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study.

Next screen

Game 2: INSTRUCTIONS

This game is played the same way as the first game. Like the previous game, in this game there are two players: you and 'Player 3'.

You will not know the person you will be playing with (neither will the other person know you). Player 3, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. We have chosen to give you one piece of information about Player 3:

Player 3 identifies politically with the PSOE.

Player 3 elected to give you X NetQuest points. We tripled this amount so that you will receive X*3. Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, please select the amount from the options below that you want to return (if any) from the total you received from Player 3 and advance to the next game.

Next screen

Game 3: INSTRUCTIONS

This game is played the same way as the first game. Like the previous game, in this game there are two players: you and 'Player 4'.

You will not know the person you will be playing with (neither will the other person know you). Player 4, like you, received 5 NetQuest points to participate in the study. We have chosen to give you one piece of information about Player 4:

Player 4 identifies politically with the PP.

Player 4 elected to give you X NetQuest points. We tripled this amount so that you will receive X*3. Once you understand this game and are ready to make a decision, please select the amount from the options below that you want to return (if any) from the total you received from Player 4 and advance to the next game.

[***]

Distributions of player 1s' decisions in different games

Figure A2. Trust in different games in Spain (wave 1, party and social class games). PSOE= Spanish Socialist Party; PP= Popular Party.

Figure A3. Trust in different games in Spain (wave 3, anonymous, regional and ideology games). BC=Basque/Catalan identity; MA=Madrilenian/Andalusian.

Figure A4. Trust in the anonymous game in Spain.

Figure A5. Trust in different games in Portugal (wave 1, anonymous and party games). PS=(Portuguese) Socialist Party; PSD=(Portuguese) Socialist Democratic Party. Figure A6: Trust in the anonymous game in Spain.

Appendix B: Question wording and variable coding; sample characteristics.

Question wording and variable coding[4]

Party identification: two questions: "Is there any particular political party you might feel closer to than all the other parties?" "yes/no"; "Which one?" (choice among a list of party labels). Recoded into two dummies for Spain: (1) PP; (0) other; (1) PSOE; (0) other. Recoded into two dummies for Portugal: (1) PS; (0) other; (1) PSD; (0) other.

Regional identity: "To what extent do you feel close to your Autonomous community?" (1) not at all close; (2) not very close; (3) fairly close; (4) very close. Recoded into: (1) 'Basque/Catalan identity' (2, 3, 4 categories crossed with respondent's residence in Basque country and Catalonia), (0) 'other'; (1) 'Madrilenian identity' (2, 3, 4 categories crossed with respondent's residence in Madrid) and (0) 'other' (1) 'Andalusian identity' (2, 3, 4 categories crossed with respondent's residence in Andalusia) and (0) 'other'.

Ideological identities: "In politics, people sometimes talk about "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 1 means left and 10 means right?" Scale from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right). Recoded into: (1) 'Left' (1, 2, 3, 4), (0) 'other'; (1) 'Centre" (5), (0) 'other'; (1) 'Right' (6, 7, 8, 9, 10), (0) 'other'.

Social class:

Table B1. Social class scheme (NetQuest).

Occupation	Education					
	No education	Primary	Lower secondary	Upper secondary	Tertiary (1)	Tertiary (2)
Farmer	E	E	D	C	C	C
Landowner	E	E	D	C	C	C

Entrepreneur (small company)	C	C	C	B	B	B
Entrepreneur (medium-sized	C	C	C	B	B	A
Entrepreneur/merchant (less than 5	C	C	B	B	A	A
Entrepreneur/merchant (no	C	C	B	B	B	B
Entrepreneur/merchant (more than 5	B	B	A	A	A	A
Self-employed	C	C	B	B	A	A
Craftsman	D	D	C	C	C	C
Manager/Director of a public/private	B	B	A	A	A	A
Manager/Director of a public/private	C	C	B	B	A	A
Officer in company or public	C	B	B	B	A	A
Officer in company or public	C	C	C	B	B	B
Foreman	D	D	C	C	B	B
Seller/dealer/businessperson	D	C	C	C	B	B
Office worker	C	C	C	C	B	B
Specialized worker/policeman	D	D	C	C	C	C
Worker/domestic worker	E	D	D	D	C	C
Subordinate employee	E	D	D	D	C	C

Note: A: High; B: Middle-high; C=Middle; D=Middle-low; E=Low

Sample characteristics

To assess the importance of partisanship across the two countries and also the role of other potential conflicts, we designed a survey experiment implemented online. The survey was administered in Portugal in May 2012 to a quota sample of respondents between age 18 and 65 with a final 1005 respondents who completed both the experiment and the questionnaire. In Spain, the two studies were implemented in February-March 2012 and in May-June 2013 to respondents of the same age range and with final samples equal to 1275 and 886 respectively. The participants were rewarded with ‘NetQuest’ points, convertible into goods from the survey company. The quotas were designed to approach the actual composition of the Spanish population in terms of sex, age, and territorial areas. The survey focuses on treatment effects rather than descriptive inference. As can be seen from Tables B2 and B3, while our sample is somewhat skewed in that our respondents are slightly younger and more educated, we have adequate variation in both socio-demographic characteristics and in our main variable of interest, namely partisanship. In fact, both in Spain and Portugal we have statistics for people that feel close to one of the four parties which can be considered very similar to those provided by the European Social Survey (in Portugal, in some cases these are greater).

Table B2. Characteristics of the sample in Spain.

	NetQuest Panel (February-March 2012) (18-65)	NetQuest Panel (May-June 2013) (18-65)	ESS6 (2012) (18-65)[a]
Gender (% male)	50.27	51.99	49.57

Age (mean)	37.98	37.67	42.27
Education (%)			
Primary or no education	1.88	1.70	21.19
Secondary	60.47	59.82	55.10
Tertiary	37.65	38.46	23.71
Close to a party (%)			
PP	15.76	15.32	9.45
PSOE	15.29	15.44	12.37
CiU	3.53	2.61	1.59
PNV	0.71	0.79	0.71
N	1275	881	1494

[a] ESS data includes subjects only between 18 and 65 years of age to easy comparability. Data are weighted ("design weights" are used) and missing cases are excluded. For more information see www.europeansocialsurvey.org).

Table B3. Characteristics of the sample in Portugal.

	NetQuest Panel (2012) (May 2012) (18-65)	ESS6 (2012) (18-65)[a]
Gender (% male)	50.45	60.62
Age (mean)	37.19	43.09
Education (%)		
Primary or no education	1.54	39.46
Secondary	31.41	49.15
Tertiary	67.04	11.39
Close to a party (%)		
PS	13.53	13.23
PSD	18.05	8.47
CDS-PP	7.46	1.20
PCP	4.78	2.5[b]
N	1005	1507

[a] ESS data includes subjects only between 18 and 65 years of age to easy comparability. Data are weighted ("design weights" are used) and missing cases are excluded. For more information see www.europeansocialsurvey.org).

[b] The figure refers to the 'Unitary Democratic Coalition' (CDU) formed by PCP and 'The Greens'.

Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and basic statistical tests of Player 1's trust allocations by political identities and treatments; tables for panel Tobit models with random effects.

Descriptive statistics and basic statistical tests of Player 1's trust allocations by political identities and treatments

Table C1. Mean trust allocations by different party identities and games in Portugal.

b) Party identities

Sender	Anonymous Recipient	PS Recipient	PSD Recipient	CDS-PP Recipient	PCP Recipient	N
PS	2.30 (1.10)	2.77 (1.44)	1.51 (1.27)	1.46 (1.48)	2.13 (1.47)	61
PSD	2.56 (1.20)	1.70 (1.25)	2.76 (1.46)	2.24 (1.34)	1.76 (1.50)	82
CDS-PP	2.35 (1.10)	1.65 (1.27)	2.13 (1.42)	2.90 (1.39)	1.70 (1.54)	40
PCP	2.10 (1.51)	1.62 (1.50)	1.48 (1.36)	1.48 (1.36)	3.14 (1.65)	21

Standard deviation in parenthesis

Table C2. Test of differences in mean trust allocations by different party identities and games in Portugal.

b) Party identities

Sender	Anonymous-PS		Anonymous-PSD		Anonymous-CDS-		Anonymous-PCP	
	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon
PS	-0.48*	YES	0.79*	YES	0.84*	YES	0.16	NO
PSD	0.87*	YES	-0.20	NO	0.32*	YES	0.81*	YES
CDS-	0.70*	YES	0.23	NO	-0.55*	YES	0.65*	YES
PCP	0.48*	YES	0.62*	YES	0.62*	YES	-1.05*	YES

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05

Table C3. Mean trust allocations by different political identities and games in Spain.

b) Party identities

Sender	Anonymous Recipient	PSOE Recipient	PP Recipient	PNV Recipient	CiU Recipient	N
PSOE	2.45 (1.24)	3.15 (1.35)	1.01 (1.34)	1.29 (1.32)	1.59 (1.41)	99
PP	2.69 (1.27)	1.06 (1.24)	3.47 (1.38)	1.00 (1.05)	1.20 (1.18)	88
PNV	1.80 (1.10)	1.80 (1.30)	0.60 (0.89)	3.80 (1.10)	2.00 (1.22)	5
CiU	2.57 (1.31)	1.91 (1.56)	1.30 (1.58)	2.48 (1.44)	3.52 (1.47)	23

Standard deviation in parenthesis

b) Social class identities

Sender	Anonymous Recipient	Low class Recipient	Middle class Recipient	High class Recipient	N

Low class	2.39 (1.22)	3.28 (1.40)	2.83 (1.34)	1.50 (1.20)	117/50/23/28
Middle class	2.57 (1.28)	3.61 (1.34)	3.10 (1.39)	1.49 (1.59)	205/54/101/47
High class	2.71 (1.26)	3.40 (1.31)	3.22 (1.27)	1.75 (1.62)	298/81/73/151

Standard deviation in parenthesis

b) Regional identities

Sender	Anonymous Recipient	Basque Recipient	Catalan Recipient	Madrilenian Recipient	Andalusian Recipient	N
Basque	3.27 (1.74)	3.91 (1.70)	3.46 (2.12)	2.82 (1.94)	3.27 (1.85)	11
Catalan	2.91 (1.39)	3.05 (1.55)	3.42 (1.57)	2.51 (1.61)	2.73 (1.63)	84
Madrilenian	3.45 (1.37)	2.92 (1.70)	2.64 (1.81)	3.55 (1.46)	3.16 (1.59)	86
Andalusian	3.10 (1.41)	2.22 (1.59)	1.86 (1.78)	2.82 (1.51)	3.68 (1.38)	59

Standard deviation in parenthesis

d) Ideological identity

Sender	Anonymous Recipient	Left Recipient	Centre Recipient	Right Recipient	N
Left	3.35 (1.33)	3.56 (1.41)	1.30 (1.56)	2.68 (1.51)	205
Centre	3.15 (1.69)	2.46 (1.71)	3.00 (1.79)	2.25 (1.80)	74
Right	2.95 (1.53)	2.00 (1.74)	2.89 (1.56)	2.72 (1.65)	110

Standard deviation in parenthesis

Table C4. Test of differences in mean trust allocations by different political identities and games in Spain.

b) Party identities

Sender	Anonymous-PSOE		Anonymous-PP		Anonymous-PNV		Anonymous-CiU	
	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon
PP	1.64*	YES	-0.77*	YES	1.69*	YES	1.49*	YES
PSOE	-0.70*	YES	1.44*	YES	1.16*	YES	0.87*	YES
PNV	0.00	NO	1.20	NO	-2.00*	NO	-0.20	NO
CiU	0.65*	YES	1.26*	YES	0.09	NO	-0.96*	YES

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 (the same criteria has been used for the Wilcoxon signed rank test)

b) Social class identities

Sender	Anonymous-Low class		Anonymous-Middle class		Anonymous-High class	
	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon
Low class	-0.92*	YES	-0.39	NO	0.82*	YES
Middle class	-0.96*	YES	-0.44*	YES	1.09*	YES
High class	-0.65*	YES	-0.70*	YES	0.98*	YES

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 (the same criteria has been used for the Wilcoxon signed rank test)

b) Regional identities

Sender	Anonymous-Basque		Anonymous-Catalan		Anonymous-Madrilenian		Anonymous-Andalusian	
	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon
Basque	-0.64 (0.45)	NO	-0.18 (0.46)	NO	0.46 (0.43)	NO	0.00 (0.38)	NO
Catalan	-0.14 (0.11)	NO	-0.51* (0.14)	YES	0.39* (0.13)	YES	0.18 (0.13)	NO
Madrilenian	0.53* (0.13)	YES	0.81* (0.15)	YES	-0.09 (0.12)	NO	0.29 (0.09)	NO
Andalusian	0.88* (0.18)	YES	1.24* (0.22)	YES	0.29* (0.14)	NO	-0.58* (0.16)	YES

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 (the same criteria has been used for the Wilcoxon signed rank test)

d) Ideological identity

Sender	Anonymous-Left		Anonymous-Centre		Anonymous-Right	
	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon	t-test	Wilcoxon
Left	-0.21* (0.09)	YES	0.66* (0.09)	YES	2.04* (0.11)	YES
Centre	0.69* (0.19)	YES	0.15 (0.16)	NO	0.89* (0.19)	YES
Right	0.95*	YES	0.05	NO	0.23	NO

	(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.15)	

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 (the same criteria has been used for the Wilcoxon signed rank test)

Tables for panel Tobit models with random effects for the partisanship treatment

Table C5. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and (co- and rival) partisan games.

	Portugal	Spain
Type of game (ref: stranger)		
Same party id	0.524***	0.829***
	(0.117)	(0.134)
Different party id	-0.776***	-1.762***
	(0.096)	(0.118)
Constant	2.467***	2.650***
	(0.123)	(0.122)
Sigma (u)	1.304***	1.138***
	(0.081)	(0.085)
Sigma (e)	1.147***	1.343***
	(0.033)	(0.047)
Occasions	1,020	860
Number of id	204	215
Chi2 (Wald)	202.2***	520.7***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C6. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the co- and rival partisan games, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Portugal and Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

	Portugal	Spain
Same party	0.443***	0.680***
	(0.099)	(0.109)
Different party	-0.666***	-1.399***
	(0.081)	(0.094)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C7. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and partisan games by party identities in Portugal.

	b	*SE*
Party identities (ref: PS ID)		
PSD ID	0.276	(0.292)
CDS-PP ID	0.065	(0.352)
PCP ID	-0.272	(0.444)
Experimental treatment (ref: stranger)		
PS treatment	0.536***	(0.206)
PSD treatment	-0.995***	(0.208)
CDS-PP treatment	-1.107***	(0.209)
PCP treatment	-0.253	(0.206)
Interactions (Party identity*Experimental treatment)		
PSD*PS	-1.600***	(0.272)
PSD*PSD	1.241***	(0.273)
PSD*CDS-PP	0.729***	(0.273)
PSD*PCP	-0.745***	(0.272)
CDS-PP*PS	-1.404***	(0.327)
CDS-PP*PSD	0.705**	(0.327)
CDS-PP*CDS-PP	1.767***	(0.329)
CDS-PP*PCP	-0.557*	(0.328)
PCP*PS	-1.236***	(0.421)
PCP*PSD	0.090	(0.422)
PCP*CDS-PP	0.231	(0.422)
PCP*PCP	1.605***	(0.420)
Constant	2.369***	(0.222)
Sigma (u)	1.309***	(0.081)
Sigma (e)	1.104***	(0.032)
Observations	1,020	
Number of id	204	
Chi2 (Wald)	270.2***	

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C8. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and partisan games by party identities, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Portugal (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Game	Player 1	
PS ID	PS ID	0.457***
		(0.175)
	PSD ID	-0.893***
		(0.147)
	CDS-PP ID	-0.724***
		(0.211)
	PCP ID	-0.570*
		(0.298)
PSD ID	PS ID	-0.819***
		(0.169)
	PSD ID	0.210
		(0.150)
	CDS-PP ID	-0.247
		(0.215)
	PCP ID	-0.726**
		(0.293)
CDS-PP ID	PS ID	-0.905***
		(0.169)
	PSD ID	-0.324**
		(0.150)
	CDS-PP ID	0.559***
		(0.214)
	PCP ID	-0.705**
		(0.293)
PCP ID	PS ID	-0.215
		(0.175)
	PSD ID	-0.840***

		(0.148)
	CDS-PP ID	-0.678***
		(0.212)
	PCP ID	1.136***
		(0.301)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C9. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and partisan games by party identities in Spain.

	b	SE
Party identities (ref: PP ID)		
PSOE ID	-0.256	(0.258)
PNV/CiU ID	-0.314	(0.384)
Experimental treatment (ref: stranger)		
PSOE treatment	-2.165**	(0.210)
PP treatment	0.936**	(0.204)
PNV/CiU treatment	-1.965**	(0.206)
Interactions (Party identity*Experimental treatment)		
PSOE*PSOE	2.972**	(0.284)
PSOE*PP	-2.962**	(0.286)
PSOE*PNV/CiU	0.704*	(0.281)
PNV/CiU*PSOE	1.441**	(0.420)
PNV/CiU*PP	-2.698**	(0.429)
PNV/CiU*PNV/CiU	2.544**	(0.415)
Constant	2.806**	(0.188)
Sigma (u)	1.144**	(0.084)
Sigma (e)	1.305**	(0.046)
Observations	860	
Number of id	215	
Chi2 (Wald)	573.0	

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C10. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and partisan games by party identities, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Game	Player 1	
PSOE ID	PSOE ID	0.672***
		(0.159)
	PP ID	-1.703***
		(0.158)
	PNV/CiU ID	-0.607**
		(0.303)
PP ID	PSOE ID	-1.560***
		(0.149)
	PP ID	0.754***
		(0.163)
	PNV/CiU ID	-1.380***
		(0.286)
PNV/CiU ID	PSOE ID	-1.033***
		(0.155)
	PP ID	-1.572***
		(0.159)
	PNV/CiU ID	0.488
		(0.303)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness checks: a minimal group test and analysis on the full sample.

A wide range of psychological studies has demonstrated that it can be easy to induce group-based discrimination by providing any piece of information to be used as a reference point (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971). Thus, to check for the robustness of our results, in both countries, a subset of subjects played an additional set of games involving a minimal group treatment. Specifically, we exposed these respondents to a minimal group treatment in which they were told they were assigned to one of two groups, green and blue, and that the other player belonged to the same or to a different one. The 'colour' treatment created trust discrimination (0.5 in both countries; p<0.001) as expected by theory. Nonetheless, the differences between the two colour teams are much smaller than those observed for partisanship, suggesting that party labels convey additional information.

Table C11. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and partisan games by minimal group games in Portugal and Spain.

	Portugal	Spain
Type of game (ref: stranger)		
Same colour	0.400***	0.379***
	(0.064)	(0.088)
Different colour	-0.154**	-0.285***
	(0.064)	(0.087)
Constant	2.448***	2.661***
	(0.071)	(0.097)
Sigma (u)	1.192***	1.298***
	(0.052)	(0.072)
Sigma (e)	0.953***	1.055***
	(0.024)	(0.034)
Observations	1,405	929
Number of id	469	311
Chi2 (Wald)	79.62***	57.20***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure C1. Trust and the average effect of minimal group treatment in Portugal (reference: baseline trust in strangers - dotted line). The dots are the average marginal effects of the double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects in the anonymous and the minimal group games ('Same colour' vs. 'Different colour'). The bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure C2. Trust and the average effect of the minimal group treatment in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers - dotted line). The dots are the average marginal effects of the double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects in the anonymous and the minimal group games ('Same colour' vs. 'Different colour'). The bars are 95% confidence intervals.

To check for the robustness of our results we have also run analyses on the full sample. As it can be seen from Figure C3 results are not substantially different. Moreover, as in previous research, non-partisans give more to anonymous subjects than to other partisan targets, being the latter more an “outgroup” for anonymous subjects than the former (Fowler and Kam, 2007: 820).

Figure C3. Trust allocations by party identities in Portugal and Spain (full sample) (reference: baseline trust in strangers - dotted line).

The dots are the average marginal effect estimations for the panel tobit models with random effects on the observed outcome in the anonymous and partisan games (Portugal: N=466, Occasions= 2330; PS= Socialist Party; PSD= Social-Democratic Party; CDS-PP= Centre and Social-Democratic-Popular Party; PCP= Portuguese Communist Party; Spain: N=610; Occasions= 2440; PSOE= Spanish Socialist Party; PP= Popular Party; CiU= Convergence and Union; PNV= Basque Nationalist Party). The bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Tables for panel Tobit models with random effects for the ideology, regional identity, and social class treatment.

Table C12. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and (co- and rival) ideology games.

Type of game (ref: stranger)	
Same ideology	-0.009
	(0.133)
Different ideology	-1.529***
	(0.116)
Constant	3.685***
	(0.135)
Sigma(u)	1.867***
	(0.097)
Sigma(e)	1.699***
	(0.047)
Observations	1,556
Number of id	389
Chi2(Wald)	259.0***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C13. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the co- and rival ideology games: changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Same ideology	-0.006
	(0.083)
Different ideology	-1.015***
	(0.075)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C14. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and ideology games by ideologies in Spain.

	b	*SE*
Ideology (ref: Left ID)		
Centre ID	-0.109	(0.345)
Right ID	-0.541*	(0.296)
Experimental treatment (ref: stranger)		
Left ID	0.306*	(0.160)
Centre ID	-0.912***	(0.157)
Right ID	-3.051***	(0.166)
Interactions (ideology*Experimental treatment)		
Centre*Left	-1.442***	(0.316)
Centre*Centre	0.612*	(0.316)
Centre*Right	1.612***	(0.319)
Right*Left	-1.755***	(0.271)
Right*Centre	0.813***	(0.267)
Right*Right	2.681***	(0.272)
Constant	3.828***	(0.176)
Sigma(u)	1.903***	(0.095)
Sigma(e)	1.481***	(0.041)
Observations	1,556	
Number of id	389	
Chi2(Wald)	564.7***	

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C15. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and ideology games by ideologies, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Game	Player 1	
Left ID	Left ID	0.188*
		(0.099)
	Centre ID	-0.771***
		(0.183)
	Right ID	-1.004***
		(0.149)
Centre ID	Left ID	-0.608***
		(0.105)
	Centre ID	-0.197
		(0.179)
	Right ID	-0.067
		(0.147)
Right ID	Left ID	-2.037***
		(0.104)
	Centre ID	-0.983***
		(0.184)
	Right ID	-0.253*
		(0.148)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C16. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and (co- and rival) regional games.

Type of game (ref: stranger)	
Same regional id	0.445***
	(0.118)
Different regional id	-0.629***
	(0.101)
Constant	3.661***
	(0.164)
Sigma (u)	2.122***
	(0.131)
Sigma (e)	1.143***
	(0.038)
Observations	960
Number of id	240
Chi2 (Wald)	118.8***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C17. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the co- and rival regional games, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Same regional id	0.278***
	(0.074)
Different regional id	-0.422***
	(0.068)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C18. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and regional games by regional identities in Spain.

	b	*SE*
Regional identity (ref: Basque/Catalan ID)		
Madrilenian ID	0.855**	(0.371)
Andalusian ID	0.115	(0.405)
Experimental treatment (ref: stranger)		
Basque/Catalan treatment	0.455***	(0.175)
Madrilenian treatment	-0.556***	(0.174)
Andalusian treatment	-0.212	(0.175)
*Interactions (Regional ID*Experimental treatment)*		
Madrilenian*Basque/Catalan	-1.448***	(0.260)
Madrilenian*Madrilenian	0.703***	(0.262)
Madrilenian*Andalusian	-0.229	(0.261)
Andalusian*Basque/Catalan	-1.839***	(0.279)
Andalusian*Madrilenian	0.180	(0.279)
Andalusian*Andalusian	1.031***	(0.285)
Constant	3.326***	(0.252)
Sigma(u)	2.103***	(0.129)
Sigma(e)	1.094***	(0.036)
Observations	960	
Number of id	240	

Chi2(Wald)	181.1***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C19. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and regional games by regional identities, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Game	Player 1	
Basque/Catalan ID	Basque/Catalan ID	0.301***
		(0.116)
	Madrilenian ID	-0.644***
		(0.126)
	Andalusian ID	-0.968***
		(0.151)
Madrilenian ID	Basque/Catalan ID	-0.387***
		(0.121)
	Madrilenian ID	0.086
		(0.115)
	Andalusian ID	-0.257*
		(0.149)
Andalusian ID	Basque/Catalan ID	-0.145
		(0.120)
	Madrilenian ID	-0.274**
		(0.121)
	Andalusian ID	0.518***
		(0.144)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C20. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and (co- and rival) social class games.

Type of game (ref: stranger)	
Same social class	-0.235**
	(0.114)
Different social class	0.357***

	(0.115)
Constant	2.724***
	(0.076)
Sigma (u)	1.088***
	(0.072)
Sigma (e)	1.501***
	(0.047)
Observations	1,235
Number of id	627
Chi2(Wald)	22.31***

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C21. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the co- and rival social class games, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Same social class	-0.193**
	(0.094)
Different social class	0.290***
	(0.093)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C22. Double-censored panel Tobit model with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and social class games by social class identities in Spain.

	b	*SE*
Social class (ref: Middle ID)		
Low social class ID	-0.262	(0.201)
High social class	0.173	(0.158)
Experimental treatment (ref: stranger)		
Low social class ID	1.335***	(0.223)
Middle social class ID	0.596***	(0.167)
High social class ID	-1.434***	(0.234)
Interaction (Social class*Experimental treatment)		
Low social class*Low social class	-0.224	(0.323)
Low social class*Middle social class	-0.141	(0.360)
Low social class*High social class	0.429	(0.378)
High social class*Low social class	-0.502*	(0.285)

High social class*Middle social class	0.137	(0.250)
High social class*High social class	0.223	(0.270)
Constant	2.685***	(0.122)
Sigma(u)	1.199***	(0.064)
Sigma(e)	1.225***	(0.040)
Observations	1,235	
Number of id	627	
Chi2(Wald)	333.6***	

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C23. Average marginal effects of double-censored panel Tobit regression with random effects, DV: amount sent by player 1 in the anonymous and social class games by social class, changes in the expected value of the censored outcome in Spain (reference: baseline trust in strangers).

Game	Player 1	
Low-class ID	Low-class ID	0.925**
		(0.188)
	Middle-class ID	1.064**
		(0.164)
	High class ID	0.676**
		(0.138)
Middle-class ID	Low-class ID	0.387
		(0.270)
	Middle class ID	0.499**
		(0.138)
	High class ID	0.598**
		(0.146)
High-class ID	Low-class ID	-0.831**
		(0.234)
	Middle class ID	-1.183**
		(0.180)
	High class ID	-1.021**
		(0.111)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Notes

1. The question was developed in the early 1940s and was diffused by American researchers (on this, see, for instance, Uslaner 2002, 54). The wording is usually: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" In the literature, the distinction is often made between 'particular' trust, resulting from interactions within the immediate circle of people such as relatives and family, and 'general' trust, which extends beyond a specific personal setting and includes strangers (see Freitag and Traunmüeller, 2009).

2. Other relevant instances which combine trust games with survey methods to collect data on population samples include, for instance, Ermisch et al. (2009) and Criado et al. (2015).

3. This is only a draft and shorter version of the experimental protocol only encompassing the instructions for partisanship. For reasons of clarity, the questionnaire has not been included. Note that although the games are listed in a precise order people played them following a random process. Instead, for player 2 only the general instructions are included in the protocol.

4. The questions and response sets were taken from national and international surveys such as the 'European Social Survey' (ESS) and the Spanish 'Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas' (CIS).

References

Camerer CF (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Criado H, Herreros F, Miller L and Ubeda, P. (2015). Ethnicity and trust: a multifactorial experiment. Political Studies 63: 131-152.

Delhey J, Newton, K and Welzel C (2011). How general is trust in "most people"? Solving the radius of trust problem. American Sociological Review 76: 786-807.

Ermisch J, Gambetta D, Laurie H, Siedler T and Noah Uhrig SC (2009) Measuring people's trust. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 172(4): 749-769.

Fehr E, Fischbacher U, von Rosenbladt B, Schupp J and Wagner GG (2003) A nation-wide laboratory: examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys (IZA Discussion Paper No. 715). Bonn. http://www.iza.org/ Accessed on September 2015.

Fowler JH and Kam CD (2007) Beyond the self: Social identity, altruism, and political participation. Journal of Politics 69(3): 813–827.

Freitag M and Traunmüller R (2009) Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the foundations of particularised and generalised trust. European Journal of Political Research 48: 782-803.

Glaeser EL, Laibson DI, Scheinkman JA and Soutter CL (2000). Measuring trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 811-846.

Johnson ND and Mislin AA (2011). Trust games: a meta-analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology 32: 865-889.

Kreuter F, Presser S and Tourangeau R (2008). Social desirability bias in CATI, IVR, and web surveys. The effects of mode and question sensitivity. Public Opinion Quarterly 72(5): 847-865.

Levitt SD and List JA (2007) What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 153-174.

Miller AS and Mitamura T (2003) Are surveys on trust trustworthy? Social Psychology Quarterly 66(1): 62–70.

Morton RB. and Williams KC (2010). Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality. From nature to the lab. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom E and Walker J (eds) (2003). Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Sturgis P and Smith P (2010) Assessing the validity of generalized trust questions: what kind of trust are we measuring? International Journal of Public Opinion Research 22(1): 74-92.

Tajfel H. (1970) Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American 223: 96-102.

Tajfel H, Billig MG, Bundy RP and Flament C (1971) Social categorization and intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology 1: 149-178.

Uslaner EM (2002) The Moral Foundation of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson RK and Eckel CC (2011) Trust and social exchange. In: Druckman JN, Green DP, Kuklinski JH and Lupia A (eds) Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 243-257.