Supplemental Information

Having a Say or Getting Your Way: Political Choice and Satisfaction with Democracy

Sara B. Hobolt, London School of Economics and Political Science
Julian M. Hoerner, London School of Economics and Political Science
Toni Rodon, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

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A Descriptions of Measures

Table SI1: Question wording and operationalization used in the analyses.

Variable	**Question Wording and Coding**
Satisfaction with Democracy	Q1. *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?* 1 VERY SATISFIED 2 FAIRLY SATISFIED 4 NOT VERY SATISFIED 5 NOT AT ALL SATISFIED 8 Don't know Recoded so that higher values indicate more satisfaction with democracy (inverse scale). Some election studies include a neutral middle category, which was coded as "NOT VERY SATISFIED"
Congruence	Voter were asked to place themselves on the left-right spectrum using the following question: *'In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right'* 00. LEFT, …, 10. RIGHT 98. VOLUNTEERED: DON'T KNOW 99. VOLUNTEERED: REFUSED 97. MISSING Subsequently, they were asked to rank up to nine political parties in the same manner:

	'In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [PARTY A] on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right' *Using the same scale, where would you place, [PARTY B]?* *… etc.* We then calculate the distance of the respondents' self-placements to each party they place on the left-right spectrum and then identify the smallest absolute distance. The distance score thus takes the following form: $\|x_i - x_{k1}\| * (-1)$ Where x_i is the position of respondent i according to her self-placement and x_{k1} represents the position of the closest party $k1$ of the set of all parties K as identified by the respondent We take the negative of the distance so the larger values indicate greater congruence
Government Party	We coded a party as a government party when it was in government (single party of coalition) following the election. We then calculate the minimum distance in the same way as above.
Mainstream Opposition Party	We coded a party as an opposition party when it was in opposition following the election. We then calculate the minimum distance in the same way as above.
Challenger Party	We coded a party as a challenger when it was in government no longer than one full term since 1945. We then calculate the minimum distance in the same way as above.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table SI2: Descriptive Statistics

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Sat. Dem	128263	2.58	0.79	1.00	4.00
Congruence	107645	-.53	.89	-10	0
Gov. Congruence	106474	-1.67	2.01	-10	0
Opp. Congruence	99668	-1.94	2.124196	-10	0
Challenger Congruence	97587	-2.16	2.179022	-10	0
Age	134345	3.33	1.27	1.00	5.00
Gender	134769	1.52	0.50	1.00	2.00
Education	132273	4.88	1.75	1.00	8.00
Income	133836	2.92	1.38	1.00	5.00
Pol. Knowledge	134889	1.42	1.06	0.00	3.00
ENEP	134889	5.06	1.63	2.50	10.29
Vote Government	93911	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
GDP pp.	134889	2.07	3.06	-7.30	9.35
GDP Growth	134889	30292	19676	1643	87998
Unemployment	134889	8.17	4.67	2.18	24.44

C Alternative Measurement of Congruence and Instrumentality

The following table uses expert placements of party positions as an alternative measure of congruence and instrumentality respectively.

Table SI3: Alternative operationalization: expert placements

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.01				
	(0.02)				
Government		0.02*			0.03*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.01		0.01
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01	-0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ENEP	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.28*	2.30*	2.27*	2.19*	2.26*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Number of Groups	79	78	74	73	69
Observations	106612	105171	99038	99420	93287

The table shows the impact of the explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

Table SI4 uses an alternative operationalization of challenger parties. We first categorize parties that have never been in government, those that have been in government only once, and those that have been in power more than once. Then, we calculated the ideological distance to each one of them (congruence). As the table shows, results are very similar to those shown in the main specification.

Table SI4: Alternative operationalization of challenger parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Congruence – Never in government	-0.01*		
	(0.01)		
Congruence – Once in government		-0.01*	
		(0.00)	
Congruence – More than once in government			0.07*
			(0.01)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.05*	0.05*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ENEP	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	2.39*	2.41*	2.52*
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Constant	-1.07*	-1.07*	-1.10*
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant	-0.37*	-0.36*	-0.37*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Number of groups	72	77	81
Observations	88323	93957	103267

The table shows the impact of the explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

D Satisfaction of Democracy as Dummy Variable–Logistic Regression

As a robustness check, we run all models as a logistic regression (1 'very satisfied' and 'fairly satisfied', 0 otherwise). The results are substantively very similar to Table 1.

Table SI5: Logistic Regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.10*				
	(0.02)				
Government		0.09*			0.11*
		(0.02)			(0.03)
Mainstream Opp.			0.05*		0.06*
			(0.02)		(0.02)
Challenger Opp.				-0.03*	-0.05*
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Gender	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*	0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Knowledge	0.13*	0.13*	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ENEP	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07	-0.07	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
GDP Growth	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*	0.09*	0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.33	-0.17	-0.30	-0.53	-0.15
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.48)	(0.50)
Random Effects					
Constant	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Residual	0.69	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	81	81	77	77	73
Observations	103525	102468	95768	93957	86617

The table shows the impact of the explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

E Ordered Logistic Regression

Table SI6 shows the result of an ordered logistic regression. Note that the coefficient for congruence to a challenger party ceases to be significant at the 0.05 level (but remains significant at the 0.1) level. Its negative sign remains unchanged.

Table SI6: Ordered Logistic Regression.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.12*				
	(0.02)				
Government		0.07*			0.09*
		(0.02)			(0.03)
Mainstream Opp.			0.06*		0.07*
			(0.02)		(0.02)
Challenger Opp.				-0.03	-0.04
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	0.09*	0.08*	0.08*	0.09*	0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Knowledge	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.00
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
ENEP	-0.06	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
GDP Growth	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
cut1					
Constant	-1.97*	-2.09*	-2.00*	-1.74*	-2.12*
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.41)
cut2					
Constant	-0.07	-0.17	-0.10	0.14	-0.22
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.43)
cut3					
Constant	3.00*	2.89*	2.96*	3.23*	2.88*
	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Observations	103525	102468	95768	93957	86617

The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Ordered Logistic Regression. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

F Results from Fixed Effects Estimation

We fit random effects models as our main specification in Table 1. As shown in the table below, the results are substantively the same if we fit fixed-effects models with dummies at the level of country-election (omitted) instead.

Table SI7: Fixed effects models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.04*				
	(0.01)				
Government		0.03*			0.04*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.02*		0.02*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01*	-0.02**
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.04*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ENEP	0.64*	0.53*	0.89*	0.57*	0.30*
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
GDP Growth	0.40*	0.35*	0.39*	0.47*	0.16*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.05*	0.03*	-0.10*	-0.14*	-0.14*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.50*	0.80*	0.49*	0.92	1.13
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	103525	102468	95768	93957	86617

The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Linear regression with fixed effects at the level of country elections. * $p < .05$

G Subset Analysis for Respondents who cast a Ballot

Table SI8 below show the result for a subset analysis including only the respondents who cast a ballot (81 per cent of all respondents). The results remain identical.

Table SI8: Subset analysis for respondents who cast a ballot.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.04*				
	(0.01)				
Government		0.03*			0.04*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.02*		0.02*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01*	-0.02*
				(0.00)	(0.01)
Age	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.03*	0.03*	0.04*	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
ENEP	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.40*	2.47*	2.41*	2.31*	2.46*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Random Effects					
Constant	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Residual	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.68
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	81	81	77	77	70
Observations	86234	85503	80211	78579	72897

The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

H Controlling for Winners vs. Losers

A potential criticism of our approach could be that we are capturing the effect of a respondent being more satisfied with democracy because she voted for a party which ended up in government ('winner effect'). We control for this possibility by including a dummy if the respondent voted for a party which formed part of the governing coalition after the election. The results are substantively similar, yet the difference in the size of the effect for closeness to a government and mainstream opposition party almost disappears. Note also that in line with the existing literature, we find that voting for a "winning party" has a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy.

Table SI9: Respondent voted for Government Party

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.04*				
	(0.01)				
Government		0.03*			0.03*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.02*		0.03*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01*	-0.02*
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Vote Gov	0.11*	0.08*	0.13*	0.12*	0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.03*	0.03*	0.04*	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ENEP	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.02*	0.02*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.45*	2.50*	2.47*	2.35*	2.52*
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Random Effects					
Constant	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Residual	0.69	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	79	79	75	75	71
Observations	78750	78114	733301	71814	66652

Note: The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

In addition, one could argue that the type of coalition that is later formed matters for an individual's satisfaction with democracy. In other words, the effect on SWD among those individuals that voted for a small party that later formed a coalition might be different than the effect among those that voted for the largest coalition party. The small party's degree of policy leverage is arguably not the same than that of the largest party.

Hence, we created a categorical variable that distinguishes between respondents that voted for an opposition party, and opposition party that supported the government party, a junior coalition party and a single-party government. Results can be seen in Table SI10, Model 1. They indicate once again that the degree of instrumentality matters. In particular, it is interesting to observe the differences in the coefficients between respondents that opted for a junior coalition party and those that voted a senior coalition party—and hence those that voted for parties that ended in government, but with a different degree of instrumentality. As it is seen below, the former report a higher SWD than the latter.

Model 2 refines this logic further and includes an interaction between the type of coalition partner (senior or junior) a respondent voted for and whether this option was the closest one in spatial terms. As it can be seen, the interaction is significant and positive. In other words, the analysis shows that two respondents that voted for a close ideological option, but one opted for a junior coalition party and the other one for a senior coalition party, report a significant difference in their SWD. Despite Model 2 should be taken with a grain of salt (we lose several observations and countries), it is consistent with the idea that instrumentality moderates the effect of ideological congruence on satisfaction with democracy.

Table SI10: The effect of being on a coalition on SWD

	Model 1	Model 2
Party status (opposition=RC)		
Opposition party supporting the government party	-0.10*	
	(0.04)	
Junior coalition party	0.09*	
	(0.03)	
Senior coalition party	0.16*	
	(0.04)	
Single-party government	0.12*	
	(0.04)	
Type of coalition partner (Junior coalition partner=RC)		
Senior coalition partner		0.06*
		(0.03)
Congruence		0.01*
		(0.01)
Congruence*senior coalition partner		0.02*
		(0.01)
Age	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.02*	-0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.01)
ENEP	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.02*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.39*	2.65*
	(0.14)	(0.19)
Random Effects		
Constant	0.24	0.27
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Residual	0.69	0.64
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	78	66
Observations	84613	32542

I Ideological Extremity

We acknowledge the possibility that ideological extremity of respondents might explain part of the observed congruence effect. Respondents who place themselves extremes are less likely to have a party close to them than those placing themselves in the center. We thus run an additional set of models in which we include an indicator variable who place theme selves on the extremes (1 and 2 as well as 9 and 10) of the ideological scale. The results remain identical.

Table SI11: Respondent has extreme value of self-placement variable.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.05*				
	(0.01)				
Government		0.04*			0.04*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.02*		0.02*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01*	-0.02*
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.04*	0.04*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Extreme	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ENEP	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.34*	2.39*	2.35*	2.26*	2.39*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Random Effects					
Constant	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Residual	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	81	81	77	77	70

Observations	103525	102468	95768	93957	86617

Note: The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

J Voting for non-parliamentary parties

In this section, we examine the difference between parties that obtain parliamentary representation and those that do not. Challenger parties are not able to implement policies in office, but they have the opportunity to influence the legislative debate. As argued by van der Meer and Kern (2019), in some democracies (especially consensual democracies), being in the parliament might give parties some influence on the type of policies that are implemented. In contrast, if a party does not make it into the parliament, its influence—its instrumentality—is almost negligible.

To empirically test this logic, we created a binary indicator that, for each country-election, that distinguishes between voters that supported a party that did not obtain a seat versus those that voted for a party with representation in the parliament. It is important to mention, however, that the CSES, when asking for the perceived ideological position of parties, has generally included 6-9 parties for each country, which makes the number of non-parliamentary parties in the perceived left-right location scale fairly small. This substantially reduces the number of cases and some countries are even dropped from the analysis (less than 1% of our sample, 0.88%, voted for a party that did not make it into the parliament).

Table SI12 shows the results. As it can be seen, voting for a non-parliamentary party is associated with a lower satisfaction with democracy than voting for a parliamentary party.

Table SI12: The effect of voting for a non-parliamentary party

	Model 1
Congruence	0.04*
	(0.01)
Voting for a non-parliamentary party	-0.12*
	(0.03)
Age	-0.01*
	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01*
	(0.01)
Education	0.01*
	(0.00)
Income	0.03*
	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.04*
	(0.00)
ENEP	-0.02
	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.03*
	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*
	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01
	(0.01)
Constant	2.33*

	(0.12)
Random Effects	
Constant	0.24
	(0.03)
Residual	0.69
	(0.02)
Number of Groups	81
Observations	103525

The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$.

K Voting, or not, for the most-congruent party

In this subsection we test whether results differ when we consider voters who voted for their most congruent party compared to those who did not. Accordingly, we created a dummy variable that distinguishes whether an individual voted for the closest party or not.

Table SI12 included below replicates our main models distinguishing between those who did not vote for the closest party (Model 1) and those who did vote for the closest ideological party (Model 2). As it can be seen, results are virtually the same.

Table SI13: The effect of voting for a congruent party

	Model 1	Model 2
Gov. party congruence	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Opp. party congruence	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Challenger party congruence	-0.01*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.00	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.05*	0.04*
	(0.00)	(0.01)
ENEP	-0.03	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.36*	2.48*
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Random Effects		
Constant	-1.39*	-1.38*
	(0.13)	(0.16)
Residual	-0.36*	-0.39*
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Number of Groups	73	71
Observations	63943	22674

Note: The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

L Constant number of observations

In this section, we show the results of running our model on a restricted sample taking only those respondents into account which place each type of party (i.e. government, mainstream opposition, challenger) in order to keep the number of observations constant across models. The results are substantially similar. (Table SI13).

Table SI14: Models holding the number of observations constant.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Congruence (All)	0.05*				
	(0.01)				
Government		0.04*			0.04*
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Mainstream Opp.			0.02*		0.02*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Challenger Opp.				-0.01*	-0.02*
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Knowledge	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ENEP	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP per Capita	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.31*	2.37*	2.32*	2.25*	2.39*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Random Effects					
Constant	-1.39*	-1.38*	-1.40*	-1.39*	-1.38*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Residual	-0.36*	-0.37*	-0.36*	-0.36*	-0.37*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Groups	73	73	73	73	73
Observations	86617	86617	86617	86617	86617

Note: The table shows the impact of explanatory variables on satisfaction with democracy. Multilevel linear regression with random intercepts at the level of country elections. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * $p < .05$

M List of Challenger Parties

** Indicate that the party ceases to be a challenger party during the period of investigation

Austria:
Freedom Party of Austria (FPO)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO)
The Greens - The Green Alternative (GREENS)
Liberal Forum (LIF)
Dinkhauser list
The New Austria (NEOS)
Team Stronach (TEAM)
Communist Party of Austria (KPO)
Pirate Party (PIRATES)

Belgium:
Flemish Block (VB)
Greens (AGALEV)
National Front (NF)
Ecologists (ECOLO)

Bulgaria:
*National Movement Simeon The Second (NMS II - NDST)***
United Democratic Forces (UDF)**
Movement 'Georgievden
Euroleft
Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO)
Reformist Bloc (RB)
Patriotic Front(NFSB And IMRO)
Bulgaria without Censorship(BBZ)
Attack
Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV)
Movement 21 (Oatyana Doncheva's movement)

Czech Republic
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Association for The Republic - Czech Republican Party
Green Party (SZ)
Public Affairs
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura
Pirates

Croatia
Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU)
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)
Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB)

Denmark
Socialist People's Party
Danish People's Party
Red-Green Unity List
New Alliance

Estonia
Estonian Greens

Finland
True Finns

France
National Front
Workers' Struggle
Republican And Civic Movement
*Green (EELV)***
Revolutionary Communist League

Germany
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) / Die Linke
*Buendnis 90 /Die Gruenen***
The Republicans
Party Of The Rule Of Law Offensive (Schill-Partei)
National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)
Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Pirate Party of Germany (Pirates Party)

Greece
Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.)
Ecologists- Greens (Oik.Pras)
Golden Dawn (XA)
Democratic Left(DIMAR)

Hungary
Hungarian Justice and Life Party
Hungarian Worker's Party
Alliance of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party
Alliance For Hungary - Center Party (MC)

Iceland
Left Greens **
Liberal Party
Icelandic Movement
Bright Future
Pirate Party

Ireland
Sinn Fein
*Greens***

United Left Alliance
Socialist Party

Italy
Communist Refoundation Party

Latvia
Harmony Centre
For Human Rights in Latvia

Lithuania
Nationalist Party

Montenegro
Democratic Front (DF)
Positive Montenegro
Albanian Coalition
Force for Unity
Croatian Civic Initiative

Netherlands
Green Left
Socialist Party
List Pim Fortuyn
*Christian Union***
Political Reformed Party
Party for Freedom

Norway
Progress Party

Poland
Movement For The Reconstruction Of Poland
League Of Polish Families (LPR)
Self Defence Of The Polish Republic (S)
Poland Comes First (PJN)
Congress of the New Right (KNP)
German Minority (MN)

Portugal
Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU)
Left Bloc (BE)
Portuguese Communist Workers' Party (PCTP/MRPP)
Movimento O Partido Da Terra (MPT)
Popular Monarchist Party (PPM)

Humanist Party (PH)
Party for People, Animals and Nature
Democratic Republican Party
Workers Communist Party

Romania
Greater Romania Party
New Generation Party (PNG)
Independent
People's Party - Dan Diaconescu

Serbia
United Regions of Serbia (URS)
Serbian Radical party
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM)

Slovakia
Freedom And Solidarity
Most Hid
Ordinary people - Independent personalities
People's Party Our Slovakia
We are family - Boris Kollar
Bridge

Slovenia
*Democratic Party of Retired Persons***
Slovenian National Party
For Real-New Politics Party
Gregor Virant's Civic List

Spain
United Left
Convergence and Union
Basque Nationalist Party
Canarian Coalition
Republican Left of Catalonia
Galician Nationalist Bloc

Sweden
Left Party
Green Party
Sweden Democrats
Feminist Party

Switzerland
Green Party
Liberal Party
Protestants People's Party
Ticino League
Green Liberal Part

United Kingdom
Scottish National Party
Plaid Cymru
Green Party (GP)
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

N Conjoint: Description and Robustness Checks

Survey and sample

The conjoint experiment was embedded in an online survey (conducted during the third week of May 2017 by YouGov) of a representative sample of 1,936 respondents older than 18 years. The company employs a quota sample drawn from their pool of respondents recruited from a host of different sources, including via standard advertising, and strategic partnerships with a broad range of websites. YouGov draws a sub-sample of the panel that is representative of British adults in terms of age, gender, social class, vote choice and newspaper readership, and invites this sub-sample to complete a survey. Participation in the survey was incentivized: respondents collected points for completing the survey which could be redeemed for prizes or cash for themselves or charity. More information on the YouGov methodology can be found here: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/r/8/YouGov_Online_Panel_Book-2017.pdf.

The study was conducted right before the UK general election that took place on 8 June 2017. This represents a suitable context to study the effect of congruence and instrumentality on satisfaction with democracy, as these two dimensions are likely to be present in people's mind when deciding whom to vote for and the experiment seems more credible and realistic in the context of an election campaign.

Table SI15 includes descriptive statistics of different sociodemographic variables from our YouGov sample. In order to compare the representativeness of our online sample with a face-to-face random-probability survey, Table SI15 also includes the descriptive statistics of the same variables but in this case extracted from Round 8 of the European Social Survey (British sample).[1] As it can be seen, differences between our sample and that of the ESS are not substantial. While our sample is slightly more centrist than the ESS sample, the samples are very similar on other dimensions.[2]

[1] The fieldwork for the ESS Round 8 in the UK took place between September 2016 and March 2017, very close in time to the YouGov sample. The survey includes 1,959 voting-age respondents.

[2] As a robustness check, we ran an analysis using sampling weighting. Findings are substantially the same.

Table SI15: Descriptive Statistics – Main Sociodemographic Variables

Variable	YouGov sample	ESS – Round 8
% Women	49.8	54.47
Age	47.4 (average); 16.6 (s.d.)	48.74 (average); 18.59 (s.d.)
Vote choice in 2015 general elections	Conservatives 27.9%; Labour 25.6%; Lib Dem 6.4%; UKIP 10.5%; Green 4.7%; Other 5.2%; Dk/did not vote 19.8%	Conservatives (26.2%); Labour 24.5%; Lib Dem 5.9%; UKIP 5.7%; Green 2.4%; Other 6.6% Dk/did not vote 28.7%
% Brexit supporters	48.5	45.4
Ideological self-placement	Extreme Left 2.1%; Left 24.9%; Centre 53.8%; Right 17.5%; Extreme Right 1.6%	*Extreme Left 4.6%; Left 26.1%; Centre 40.7%; Right 25.4%; Extreme Right 3.1%
Position on the immigration debate	Immigration should be reduced a lot 40.3%; Immigration should be reduced a little 28.6%; Immigration should remain the same as it is 25.5%; Immigration should be increased a little 4.0%; Immigration should be increased a lot 1.5%	N/A

Note: While the left-right self-placement question in our sample was asked with categories as response options, the ESS only included a scale from 0 (Extreme left) to 10 (Extreme right). Therefore, the ESS percentages are based on our recoding and hence not directly comparable to the YouGov sample.

Question wording of the conjoint experiment

The conjoint experiment asked respondents to choose between pairs of candidates that could differ along eight dimensions, described in the main text. Each of the eight dimensions had several attribute levels and these were fully randomized, implying that some pair of candidates could have the same attribute, while varying on others. The experiment allows us to assess the influence of different candidates' attributes on satisfaction with democracy. This approach allows for the non-parametric estimation of the treatment effects of each attribute.

The experiment was the third question respondents encountered in the questionnaire. Before the experiment, respondents had to answer two questions: the first question asked them about their ideological position. The options ranged from "Extreme Left" to "Extreme Right". The second question asked respondents to express their views on the immigration debate. The options ranged from "Immigration should be reduced a lot" to "Immigration should be increased a lot".

After these two questions, and on a different screen, respondents read the following instructions: "We would like your opinion about different political candidates in a General Election, whose names will remain confidential. The table below describes the candidates and

summarizes their position on different issues. Please review the information in the table very carefully."

Below, we show an example of a conjoint table as seen by a random respondent.

Figure SI16: Example of a conjoint table as seen by respondents



YouGov

We would like your opinion about different **political candidates in a General Election**, whose names will remain confidential. The table below describes the candidates and summarizes their position on different issues.

Please review the information in the table very carefully.

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Ethnicity	Asian British	White British
Candidate's immigration position	Immigration should be reduced a little	Immigration should be increased a little
Candidate's ideological position	Centre	Left
The candidate campaigned for	Remaining in the European Union	Leaving the European Union
Candidate's chances of being elected to Parliament	Unknown. The race is competitive	Unlikely
Candidate's party is likely to...	form a coalition majority government with another party	be in the opposition
The candidate is likely to become...	a junior minister in the government	a junior minister in the government
Gender	Male	Male

Which candidate would you vote for?

Candidate A

Candidate B

How likely or unlikely would you be to vote for:

	0 - Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 - Very likely
Candidate A											

Respondents saw the conjoint table along with three questions: First, they were asked "Which candidate would you vote for?". Second, they asked two probability-to-vote scales. The scale, for each of the candidates, ranged from 0, "Very unlikely", to 10, "Very likely". The third question asked them how satisfied would they be with democracy in Britain if these were the candidates they could choose between in a General Election.

Figure SI13 shows the Average Marginal-Component Effect (AMCE). The estimates are based on a change in values of one of our eight dimensions on the satisfaction with democracy indicator. The regression coefficients indicate the AMCE of one attribute level relative to the omitted category. If respondents put more relative weight on some attributes than others, some attributes will predict a higher satisfaction with democracy compared to the baseline level.

Figure SI17 Effect of congruence, instrumentality and demographics on satisfaction with democracy



Note: This plot shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned congruence, instrumentality and demographics attributes on satisfaction with democracy. Estimates are based on the regression estimators with clustered standard errors; bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Baseline denotes the attribute value that is the reference category for each attribute.

Robustness checks

In this subsection we run additional analyses to check the robustness of our results.

As it is standard in the literature, we first run the analysis including additional controls in the model. Accordingly, we included respondent's ideological self-placement, respondent's position on the immigration debate and respondent's gender. The inclusion of these covariates

(or others not shown here) does not change our findings. If anything, the effect of congruence and instrumentality indicators is stronger (see Table S18).

A second diagnostic check has to do with heterogeneous effects across party preferences. Some attributes might be more influential to some voters than others. If there is a particular group of voters that strongly cares about one attribute, as compared to the rest, the estimated effect will depend on this sub-group. In order to reject this possibility, we ran the same analysis but we split it according to vote intention. Figure SI19 shows the AMCE coefficients split by respondents' ideology. While a few differences are observed, results do not show that a specific group of voters care about instrumentality, while the rest cares about congruence. All voters care, to varying degrees, about both aspects of vote choice.

Finally, we ran a few additional tests to confirm the stability of our findings. One important check involves testing the stability of the estimates (carry-over effects assumptions).[3] This assumption implies that respondents would choose the same candidate as long as the two candidate profiles in the same choice task had identical attributes, regardless of what candidate profiles they had already seen. Consistent with this assumption, we found that the AMCEs are similar across the six tasks. Two additional assumptions have to do with profile order effects and attribute order effects. As for the first, we checked whether AMCEs are similar for respondents that saw the same attribute first or second. Regarding the second assumption, we ran a model in which we regress our outcome (satisfaction with democracy) on dummies that indicate the position of the attributes (1-8), and the interactions between the two. In both cases, results are substantially the same.

[3] Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D.J., Yamamoto, T. (2014) Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments, *Political Analysis*, 22(1): 1-30.

Table SI18: Conjoint analysis with and without controls

	M1 Without controls		M2 With controls	
Candidate's ideological position (b=Extreme Left)				
Left	0.070*	(0.018)	0.069*	(0.018)
Centre	0.060*	(0.018)	0.060*	(0.018)
Right	0.027	(0.019)	0.027	(0.018)
Extreme Right	-0.091*	(0.019)	-0.092*	(0.019)
The candidate campaigned for (b=Leaving the European Union)				
Remaining in the European Union	-0.009	(0.012)	-0.010	(0.012)
Candidate's immigration position (b=Immigration should be reduced a lot)				
Immigration should be reduced a little	0.004	(0.019)	0.005	(0.018)
Immigration should remain the same as it is	-0.026	(0.019)	-0.025	(0.018)
Immigration should be increased a little	-0.071*	(0.019)	-0.070*	(0.019)
Immigration should be increased a lot	-0.113*	(0.019)	-0.112*	(0.019)
Candidate's chances of being elected to Parliament (b=Very Unlikely)				
Unlikely	-0.001	(0.017)	-0.002	(0.018)
Unknown. The race is competitive	0.043*	(0.017)	0.041*	(0.017)
Likely	0.036	(0.017)	0.035*	(0.017)
Candidate's party is likely to (b=be in the opposition)				
Form a single-party majority government	0.049*	(0.014)	0.049	(0.014)
Form a coalition government with another party	0.020	(0.014)	0.019	(0.014)
The candidate is likely to become (b=a member of the opposition)				
A junior minister in the government	-0.008	(0.015)	-0.007	(0.014)
A senior minister in the government	0.024	(0.015)	0.023	(0.014)
Gender (b=Male)				
Female	-0.011	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.012)
Ethnicity (b=White British)				
Asian British	-0.041*	(0.016)	-0.039*	(0.016)
Black British	-0.022	(0.016)	-0.023	(0.016)
Respondent's ideological self-placement				✓
Respondent's position on the immigration debate				✓
Respondent's gender				✓

* $p < .05$

Figure SI19: Effect of congruence, instrumentality and demographics on satisfaction with democracy across ideology



Note: This plot shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned congruence, instrumentality and demographics attributes on satisfaction with democracy across respondent's ideology. Estimates are based on the regression estimators with clustered standard errors; bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Baseline denotes the attribute value that is the reference category for each attribute.

Figure SI20: Predicted satisfaction with democracy across different levels of instrumentality by congruent versus non-congruent choices



Note: This plot shows estimates of voting for an ideologically congruent vs non-congruent choice on satisfaction with democracy across different levels of instrumentality. Estimates are based on the regression estimators with clustered standard errors; bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Congruence is a dummy variable defined that captures whether respondent voted a candidate with his/her own ideological position or otherwise. As explained in the manuscript, the instrumentality index is constructed based on the candidate's chances of being elected, whether the candidate's party will form a majority government or will be in the opposition and whether the candidate is likely to become a senior/junior minister.

One potential concern about our analysis is that some unrealistic combination of attributes might have affected a respondent's answer. For instance, some respondents might have considered that there are no parliamentary candidates that want to "increase immigration a lot." To check the stability of our findings, we removed all conjoint tables that had this characteristic in it. We then replicated Figure 2 from the main text. The resulting Figure is inserted below. As it can be seen, results are very similar. If we remove other potentially 'unrealistic' combinations and run additional robustness checks, we obtain similar results.

Figure SI21: Predicted satisfaction with democracy across different levels of instrumentality by congruent versus non-congruent choices (without candidates that want to increase immigration a lot)