CHAPTER 2

State Institutions in North Taiwan versus South Taiwan

Hokkien Language Recognition

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Editors' Introduction: While the previous chapter emphasized how state exclusion resulted in separation, in this chapter, we see how political representation yielded an outcome that is less extreme. During the authoritarian period, the Kuomintang (KMT) imposed a repressive Mandarin-only policy. Yet as the country democratized in the early 1990s, the homogeneity of South Taiwan pulled the KMT to make linguistic concessions to its own Hokkien-speaking locals (*benshengren*). But this is only half the story. In North Taiwan, where the population has always been more heterogeneous, demographic shifts over several decades pushed the KMT away from repressive monolingualism.

Introduction

In terms of area, the island of Taiwan is small: It is slightly larger than the state of Maryland (13,974 and 12,407 square miles, respectively). At 24 million, its population is predominantly of Han Chinese descent (98%). Given the small territory size and the lack of phenotype diversity, it is no surprise that there have been no demands for regional secessionism. Yet, it is important to note that there is a strong (sub)ethnic divide—one where we see agitation for greater linguistic autonomy. There are the locals (*benshengren*), that is, the descendants of ancestors who originated from China prior to 1895. The vast majority of them (60%) speak Hokkien, a ver-

nacular that is mutually unintelligible from Mandarin Chinese, the official language of the Republic of China. While the Kuomintang (KMT) government afforded recognition to Hokkien in the 1990s, linguistic accommodation has not always been forthcoming. At one point, the government brutally repressed the use of Hokkien in public settings. In this chapter, we explore this linguistic pivot. Specifically, we ask: Why did the KMT recognize Hokkien?

This linguistic about-face in government position is puzzling for three reasons. First, when the KMT overthrew the Qing dynasty and founded the Republic of China, there was the notion that the modern nation-state needed one language. This one language would be Mandarin Chinese (Tsao 1999). If the modern nation-state is predicated on the ideology of one language, we cannot explain why the KMT recognized an alternative Chinese vernacular. Second, when the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, the government strongly vowed a return to—and an eventual reunification with—mainland China. There would be "One China." With this vision, we cannot explain why the government made room for Hokkien. Third, upon arriving on the island, the KMT displayed tremendous brutality toward the *benshengren*, often with great success. If the past was any indication of future behavior, we cannot explain why the KMT shifted from a strategy of repression to one of accommodation.

There are two conventional explanations for Hokkien recognition. The first is about a demographic shift: With a declining *waishengren* population—that is, descendants of those who arrived in Taiwan with the KMT—we see increasing calls for multiculturalism (see Wu and Lau 2019). The second is about democratization: The introduction of opposition parties and legislative elections resulted in the recognition of Hokkien (and other vernaculars) (see Dreyer 2003; Dupré 2017). In this chapter, we contend that the two explanations each tell half a story—specifically, a *regional* story. The demographic shift was predominantly a northern phenomenon, where diversity of ethnicities translated into a *push* away from the recognition of one singular language, despite high levels of Mandarin proficiency all around. And the political changes that came with democratization had a strong southern element as the Hokkien-speaking KMT members from the area wielded the influence and *pulled* the party to recognizing Hokkien.

We know from Posner (2004, 2005) that whether an ethnic group is politically relevant depends not only on its size but also on its concentration. In Taiwan, the Hokkien speakers have always been the numerical majority. They are, however, spread unevenly throughout the island.

Specifically, they are dispersed in the north but highly concentrated in the south. In this chapter, we leverage this arrangement to test the heterogeneous effects of demographic shifts and democratization.

The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin with the timeline for how the KMT came to accommodate Hokkien—from a position of slight indifference (Chinese official monolingualism) to brutal repression (Mandarin-only monolingualism) to formal recognition (multiculturalism) in schools and mass media. Next, we present our argument, discussing why a focus on the north-south divide provides us with the requisite empirical leverage. After that, we process trace, drawing heavily on evidence from an archived survey. Given the empirical evidence, we then discuss the concept of regional identities in Taiwan. We conclude by highlighting the theoretical contributions of this chapter and the implications for other languages in Taiwan.

The Path to Hokkien Recognition

To process trace how the KMT came to recognize Hokkien, we begin with a timeline (see Ricks and Liu 2018). We can characterize the KMT's language policy in three periods. The first period was Chinese official monolingualism. The goal was primarily to eliminate any legacy of the Japanese language on the island. During this period, Hokkien was left alone. The second period shifted toward Mandarin-only monolingualism, where the government aimed to eliminate Hokkien and other Chinese vernaculars. This was the time of extreme repression: There was punishment for the use of Hokkien in public spaces. The final period is one of multiculturalism, where we see the gradual restoration of Hokkien language in education and mass media.

Chinese Official Monolingualism (1946–63)

Between 1946 and 1963, the KMT enforced assimilative policies aiming to Sinicize the *benshengren*. To this end, the government comprehensively banned the use of Japanese in daily life and instead promoted the Speaking National Language (Mandarin) movement. Under this movement, schools had to teach strictly in Mandarin. Moreover, radio stations were highly encouraged to use only Mandarin in their programs (Chen 2009). Because Hokkien—at this time—was defined as a local dialect of the Chinese language, it was not completely prohibited. Speaking in Hokkien in schools

or on the air was tolerated. It is important, however, not to conflate this tolerance as some sort of protection of native Taiwan language rights. In fact, since Japanese had become the language of the educated Taiwanese—courtesy of 50 years of colonialization—the ban on the Japanese language meant many Hokkien elites became effectively illiterate and unemployable overnight (Chou 1995).

Mandarin-Only Monolingualism (1963–90)

After eradicating the Japanese language, the KMT then pivoted its attack toward the other Chinese vernaculars. In 1963, the government adopted a bill—the first of its kind—restricting the use of language in mass media: the Regulations to Guide Broadcast and TV Station Programs. The regulation reduced the proportion of Hokkien and Hakka language programming to less than 50 percent. In 1966, the government then passed the Plan for Further Enhancement of Using National Language. This new regulation empowered school officials to punish students for speaking mother tongues on campus. By this point, Hokkien was no longer seen as instrumental for helping the *benshengren* learn Mandarin but rather viewed as obstructive.

We see even more restrictive Mandarin-only policies in the 1970s. In 1972, the Education Ministry forbade students *and teachers* from speaking Hokkien on school grounds—even in private conversations. The same year, there was an executive order demanding television stations to further reduce the broadcast hours for Hokkien programs. The 1976 Radio and Television Act additionally regulated that "local dialect use should be decreased year by year." By 1979, the government declared those unable to speak Mandarin as ineligible for a job in the civil service or in political office. And, in fact, the rhetoric was such that speaking Hokkien was construed as treason (Chen 2009).

In the early 1980s, the KMT ratcheted up their efforts to further expand the reach of Mandarin monolingualism into all public spheres. There was dissatisfaction among some circles that Mandarin had not permeated adequately into the periphery (Chen 2009, 123). In response to these calls for more radical assimilation policies, the Education Ministry drafted the Language and Word Act, thereby requiring all meetings, public speeches, conversations in public spaces, and advertisements to take place exclusively in Mandarin. But when the bill was introduced to the legislative yuan in 1985, strong opposition from civil society forced the government

to table it (Huang 1994, 55–56). From this point on, while the government continued to deny Hokkien demands for linguistic recognition, it ceased proposing any more Mandarin-only policies (56–58).

Taiwanese Multiculturalism (1990–)

By the 1990s we start to see major changes. In 1989, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), established in 1986, won the mayoral election in six counties (with one DPP-sympathizing independent taking a seventh county). Following their victory, several of the DPP mayors used executive orders to restore "mother tongue classes"—that is, Hokkien and other vernaculars—in schools. Since these classes were after-school programs—as opposed to formal courses included in the national education curriculum—local governments technically did not violate official educational language policy. But for all intents and purposes, the existence of these "mother tongue classes" marked an important departure from the core principle of monolingualism. Interestingly the Education Ministry did not intervene.

The year 1992 marked the first direct legislative election in Taiwan—thereby ending the first legislative yuan session (1948–91). The second legislative yuan abolished language restrictions in media broadcasts (Huang 1994, 72). In 1993, two native Taiwanese cabinet members confessed in the legislative yuan that "it is incorrect to enact monolingual policies that disrespect mother tongue in the past" (Chen 2009, 39). The Education Ministry also announced in the same year that mother tongue classes—while an optional course—would now be formally included in the national education curriculum. By 2000, mother tongue classes would become compulsory subjects in elementary schools. And finally, between 1995 and 2000, the KMT permitted privately owned radio stations to use mostly Hokkien in their programs.

The North-South Divide

Having established the timeline, we now discuss the north-south divide in Taiwan. To focus on the Han Chinese as one ethnic group—because of their shared phenotype—ignores the variations in their language use and ancestral origins; it also overlooks how these subethnic groups are geographically concentrated (see Lin, Wu, and Lee 2006). When we consider subgroup fractionalization (see Selway 2011, 2015), we see four socially

TABLE 2.1. Ethnic Groups in Taiwan

Phenotype	Ancestral Origin	Language	Region	Population
Han Chinese	*Benshengren*[a]	Hokkien	All over—esp. South	73.3%
		Hakka	North	12%
	Waishengren[b]	Mandarin Chinese	North	13%
Austronesian	Taiwanese aborigines		East	3%

Source: Huang (1994).

[a] *Benshengren* ("person of the province"): Ancestors arrived in Taiwan from southern China (specifically Fujian and Guangdong) during the Qing dynasty but before the Japanese colonialization (1895).

[b] *Waishengren* ("person from outside the province"): Ancestors arrived in Taiwan from all over China in the aftermath of the Japanese colonialization often with the KMT (1945–59).

relevant groups (see Birnir et al. 2015). Table 2.1 illustrates the relationship between these groups. Of the four groups, three are under the rubric of "Han Chinese"—constituting about 98 percent of the island's population today.

There are two important ethnic cleavages among the Han Chinese. The first is linguistic. The majority speak Hokkien, a vernacular with eight tones. Hokkien shares more commonality with the vernaculars of southern China—and in some cases even northern Vietnam—than with those of northern China (i.e., Mandarin). For the most part, Hokkien and Mandarin are mutually unintelligible.

The second cleavage of importance is the ancestral origin—in terms of both *when* they came and *where* they came from. The first wave of Han Chinese migration came during the Qing dynasty starting as early as 1760. Around then, immigration restrictions were lifted, and men—mostly from the coastal area of Fujian province (where they speak Hokkien)—made the journey to Taiwan. An imperial decree, up until 1875, forbade women from leaving China. China would subsequently cede the island to Japan in 1895 following the First Sino-Japanese War. This would mark an exogenously induced cultural split between the Han Chinese in Taiwan from their co-ethnics on the mainland. During the 50 years of Japanese colonialization (1895–1945), there was substantial cultural influence from the colonial authorities—from architectural development to loan words. For example, although the Japanese initially viewed themselves as ethnically superior, by the 1930s they saw the Taiwanese as ethnically Japanese and thereby afforded the latter the privilege of fighting for the emperor (Ching 2001; Hu and Liu 2020).

When the Japanese relinquished Taiwan at the end of World War II,

the Japanese culture had spread throughout the island. More importantly, the Han Chinese on the island had no professed affinity for the KMT government in Beijing. After all, when the KMT overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of China in 1911, Taiwan was still colonized by Japan. To the Han Chinese in Taiwan, there were questions both about China's claim to the island and about the KMT's legitimacy to the people. Efforts to push back against the KMT, however, were futile. By 1949, when the KMT retreated to Taiwan to escape the communist onslaught, the government brought with it an influx of outsiders. We would subsequently see a tension between them and the Han Chinese already on the island.

On the one hand, the *waishengren* (literally, people from outside the province) were from all over China and spoke Mandarin Chinese. Some spoke Mandarin as their native tongue; others spoke it as a lingua franca. These newcomers had spent considerable effort fighting both the Japanese and the communists. And while they were a numerical minority, the strength of the KMT rendered them the politically dominant—if not outright monopolistic—group. On the other hand, the Han Chinese already on the island spoke mostly Hokkien, had survived Japanese colonialization—in some cases fighting for the Japanese—and did not identify with either the Republic of China or the KMT. Despite constituting the numerical majority, the *benshengren* (literally, people of the province) were politically dominated—if not outright repressed—for multiple decades.

Given these linguistic and ancestral cleavages, we see ascriptive differences between the north and the south. When the Mandarin-speaking *waishengren* settled down in Taiwan, they were concentrated primarily in the north—specifically, Taipei City and Keelung. In 1990, 26.1 percent of the *waishengren* population lived in Taipei City alone, while 23.2 percent lived across the eight southern cities and counties combined. Put differently, the *waishengren* were a quarter of the Taipei City population—but only 10 percent of the population of the south.

Table 2.2 shows the distribution—based on a nationally representative survey (Chen 2001)—of each subethnic group population in northern and southern Taiwan. Here we see a pronounced difference in the demographic structure between the two regions. On the one hand, the north is ethnically diverse (Herfindahl Index: 0.5722). While the plurality of the island's *waishengren* is here, they are far from the only ones. On the other hand, in the south, the ethnic population is quite homogeneous (Herfindahl Index: 0.2836). And while not all Hokkiens live in the south, 84 percent of them do. There are very few areas where the Hokkiens do not constitute the

TABLE 2.2. Ethnicity of Respondent's Father (1993)

Ethnic Group			North[a]	South[b]
Han Chinese	*Benshengren*	Hokkien	58.22%	83.95%
		Hakka	15.13%	8.64%
	Waishengren	Mainlanders	25.66%	6.38%
Austronesian	Taiwanese aborigines		0.99%	1.03%
Herfindal Index			0.5722	0.2836

Source: Chen (2001).

Note: One northern county (Yilan County) and one southern county (Chiayi County) were not sampled in this survey.

[a] Keelung City, Taipei City, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, and Hsinchu County

[b] Chiayi City, Tainan City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City, Pingtung County, and Penghu County

majority. In fact, there is only one singular township in the south where the *waishengren* even reach 20 percent of the population. We see high concentrations of Hokkien-speaking *benshengren* in Changhwa, Pintung, and Tainan counties—all in the south. As it turns out, the administrative boundaries of the south have matched against not only language and ancestral origins but also the 2000 presidential elections, when the KMT would lose the presidency for the first time. These ascriptive differences suggest the importance of focusing on the north versus the south when examining the politics of Hokkien recognition.

There are two reasons why we would expect different causal stories between regions. First, regions are a social unit. They aggregate who people interact with on a regular basis—specifically, whether these other people are co-ethnics or not. We know contact with diversity can increase out-group tolerance (Oliver and Wong 2003), inclusive of their mother tongues (Liu 2015; Liu, Brown, and Dunn 2015). We also know that in linguistically diverse settings, we should see convergence on a lingua franca (Laitin 1988; Liu 2015, 2021). If the north is more diverse than the south, then we should see weakening preferences for Mandarin-only monolingual policies in this region—but also the increasing use of Mandarin Chinese as a lingua franca. In contrast, in the south where the population is homogeneously Hokkien, we should see continued preferences for the Hokkien vernacular.

Second, regions are a political unit. Elections ensure that the preferences of the district are represented. We know political parties respond strategically to the behaviors of other parties (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). When an opposition party is able to mobilize an electoral base, the

governing party must respond by co-opting opposition elites or making policy concessions (Birnir 2006; Gandhi 2008; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). Considering the south is typically the electoral base for the opposition, we should see the KMT make grand gestures to the Hokkien-speaking party members from the south.

Demographic Shifts, Democratization, and the North-South Divide

In this section, we provide the evidence—mostly of the hoops varietal (see Ricks and Liu 2018)—to demonstrate how the causal processes unfolded differently in the north versus the south. We will see how, in the north, demographic shifts pushed the KMT toward multiculturalism but how, in the south, it was democratization that allowed the southern-based KMT members to pull the party to Hokkien recognition.

Demographic Shifts

For the *waishengren*—specifically the first-generation mainlanders—the monolingual policy was no big deal. While the *waishengren* spoke different vernaculars at home, what is important here is that they were all proficient in Mandarin. This was because the KMT had promoted the language as a lingua franca throughout China dating back to 1920. In contrast, since the *benshengren* were not brought under KMT control until the government showed up on the island in 1949, their exposure to Mandarin was quite late, thereby rendering what the *waishengren* saw as a lingua franca a language of oppression for everyone else.

And while the first-generation *waishengren* were generally more supportive of the KMT's Mandarin-only policy, it is important to recognize that their proportion of the population was small from the outset—and continued to decline over time. Between 1946 and 1955, there were just over one million *waishengren* (1.1 million–1.21 million) in Taiwan (Yap 2018, 16). This would make them about 20 percent of the island. However, as the island's population grew from 9.3 million in 1956 to 20.3 million in 1990—an annual growth rate of more than 1 percent—the *waishengren* population would gradually decrease to an estimated 13 percent. We see this decline across all counties and cities (see fig. 2.1).

In addition to declining population numbers, the *waishengren* also faced higher rates of mixed marriage. Here, we return to the 1993 survey. We classify respondents into two groups: those born before 1950 and those

TABLE 2.3. Ethnicity of Each Parent (Respondents Born Pre-1950)

		Father's Ethnicity				
		Hokkien	*Hakka*	*Aborigine*	*Waishengren*	***Total***
Mother's Ethnicity	*Hokkien*	**366 (99.46%)**	2 (3.39%)	0 (0%)	5 (5.88%)	373 (72.29%)
	Hakka	1 (0.27%)	**57 (96.61%)**	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	58 (11.24%)
	Aborigine	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	**4 (100%)**	0 (0%)	4 (0.78%)
	Waishengren	1 (0.27%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	**80 (94.12%)**	81 (15.7%)
	Total	368 (100%)	59 (100%)	4 (100%)	85 (100%)	**516 (100%)**

Source: Chen (2001).

TABLE 2.4. Ethnicity of Each Parent (Respondents Born Post-1950)

		Father's Ethnicity				
		Hokkien	*Hakka*	*Aborigine*	*Waishengren*	***Total***
Mother's Ethnicity	*Hokkien*	**608 (99.02%)**	4 (3.67%)	0 (0%)	57 (50.89%)	669 (79.17%)
	Hakka	6 (0.98%)	**104 (95.41%)**	2 (20%)	13 (11.61%)	125 (14.79%)
	Aborigine	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	**8 (80%)**	5 (4.46%)	13 (1.54%)
	Waishengren	0 (0%)	1 (0.92%)	0 (0%)	**37 (33.04%)**	38 (4.5%)
	Total	614 (100%)	109 (100%)	10 (100%)	112 (100%)	**845 (100%)**

Source: Chen (2001).

born after. Given that 86 percent of first-generation *waishengren* came to Taiwan before 1951 (Yap 2018, 15), we assume that a respondent whose father is *waishengren* and who was born before 1951 was therefore not born in Taiwan.[1] The following tables show the ethnicity of each parent for respondents born pre-1950 (table 2.3) and post-1950 (table 2.4).

Note that among the 516 respondents who were born before 1950, almost all of them had parents in co-ethnic marriages (98.25%). This was the case regardless of the parents' ethnicity. This consistency ceases when we shift our focus to those born after 1950. While Hokkiens, Hakkas, and aborigines had parents who still maintained high rates of co-ethnic marriages, for *waishengren* the number drops to 33 percent. Put differently, for every three *waishengren* men getting married, only one had a *waishengren* wife.

1. There was no respondent in the survey sample who was born in 1950 and who had a *waishengren* father.



Fig. 2.1. Declining first-generation *waishengren* population. (Data from Census Report, various years.)


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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The implication here is important: If 67 percent of these *waishengren* respondents were from households with a *waishengren* father but a *benshengren* mother, it means they grew up hearing and speaking Hokkien or another vernacular at home. Under such conditions, while these individuals may be considered *waishengren* because of their father's lineage, they were less likely than their father to champion a Mandarin-only monolingual policy. And since *waishengren* were much more likely to be situated in the north (as we saw in table 2.1), what this means is a shifting attitude—but only among northerners.

Another observable implication of the diversity in the north and the homogeneity in the south is the linguistic repertoire of the individuals. While the government adopted and enforced Mandarin-only monolingualism, we still see interesting variation in the preference for language use (see table 2.5). For ethnic Hokkien respondents in the north, almost 80 percent of the interview respondents opted for Mandarin. This seems to suggest that in the north—where there is greater diversity—Mandarin served a lingua franca purpose. It was necessary for communicating across subethnic groups. But is this diversity a driver for the use of the lingua franca? We consider the counterfactual. And as it turns out, this is the south. In the south, where Hokkien was dominant, it remains so. More than half of the respondents opted for Hokkien as the medium of the interview. The homogeneity in the area has allowed—if not outright encouraged—the continued use of the mother tongue in their daily lives (see Liu 2015).

If we ignore regional differences, it would be easy to attribute the developments in the north to the whole country—for example, there was widespread diversity, and mixed marriages were common. There would also be the assumptions that the increasing tolerance for multiculturalism was widespread and that Mandarin was widely accepted as a lingua franca. But this was certainly not the case in the south. The south provided the Hokkien-speaking *benshengren* a social base that would prove instrumental for civil society. Consider the events that transpired on December 10, 1979, in Kaohsiung, the largest city in the south. On that day, an opposition magazine decided to host a demonstration on International Human Rights Day; the subsequent police crackdown resulted in the arrest of eight high-profile pro-democracy activists along with more than 50 additional individuals. This event, the Meilidao Incident, is often considered one of the key events that would galvanize Taiwanese civil society's demands for democracy (Jacobs 2016).

TABLE 2.5. Language Used to Conduct Interview (Hokkien Speakers)

Language	North[a]	South[b]
Mandarin Chinese	79.49%	46.81%
Hokkien	19.66%	52.45%
Hakka	0%	0%
Other Language(s)	0.85%	0.74%

Source: Chen (2001).

Note: One northern county (Yilan County) and one southern county (Chiayi County) were not sampled in the survey.

[a] Keelung City, Taipei City, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, and Hsinchu County

[b] Chiayi City, Tainan City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City, Pingtung County, and Penghu County

Democratization

The process of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s also played an important role. Political liberalization included a restructured legislative yuan. The first legislative yuan (1948–91) was elected in 1948—*in China*. Half of the legislators (380) would subsequently flee to Taiwan in 1949. To maintain the legislature's legitimacy of representing the entirety of China, the government put off reelection. In lieu, there were supplementary elections. In these supplementary elections, legislators were elected by direct constituency, vocational groups, and overseas Chinese. But since the KMT largely controlled the election of occupational group representatives and the president appointed the overseas Chinese representatives, the KMT always controlled the first legislative yuan. Under such conditions, the government could ignore civil society demands—including calls for Hokkien recognition.

But things would change by 1991. Calls for democratization led to constitutional reform. The 1991 amendment ended the first legislative yuan, abolished seats for vocational group representatives, and changed the election of overseas Chinese representatives into a proportional system. For the second legislative yuan, all legislators were elected by general votes. And as a result, political demands from civil society—including those mobilizing from the south—translated into policy demands by their elected officials.

We also see regional influences manifesting in KMT party politics. Within the KMT, the *benshengren* politicians from the south (and center) were gaining political influence. Factionalism deeply shaped Taiwanese

politics after 1945. Because the KMT had no roots on the island prior to its arrival, in 1949, it needed to establish order quickly. As a solution, the party found it more conducive to build clientelist networks (Chen 1995). At the local levels (from the cities and counties to the villages and towns), there were factions with *benshengren*, who had the ability to mobilize mass political support, and these individuals were able to continuously win mayoral and council elections. And as these local *benshengren* joined the KMT, their victories—even at the local levels—helped the party legitimize its rule throughout the island (Chen 1995, 180–81).

Although the KMT tried to reduce the influence of local factions in the 1970s, its reliance on them would increase after disastrous defeats in the 1989 local elections and the 1991 general election. The major opposition party—the DPP—proved skilled in organizing resources and coordinating candidates (Read 2012; Rigger 2001, 2002). The DPP—formally created in 1986—called for not just democratization but also multiculturalism. With the electoral setbacks, the KMT quickly learned that to defeat the DPP would require negotiations with local factions. This cooperation would result in the promotion of southern *benshengren* within the KMT ranks. In the second legislative yuan (1992–95), we see members from the southern factions assume key positions including speaker, deputy speaker, and party whip (Chen 1995, 233).

Identity in the South

While there is a distinct north-south divide, it is important to recognize that this cleavage is more ascriptive than ethnic in the conventional sense—that is, there is no "southern" identity. Where we see identity manifesting differently between the north and the south is with respect to China. Southerners are more inclined than their northern counterparts to identify as Taiwanese (versus Chinese). Political liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with increasing freedom of expression—meaning opposition elites publicly championed identification with Taiwan, a distinct Taiwanese culture inclusive of Hokkien and other vernaculars, and even Taiwanese independence from mainland China (Hsu 2014, 96). This was in stark contrast to the status quo. During the KMT's authoritarian rule, Chinese identity—that is, identifying oneself as a Chinese and viewing Taiwan as a part of China—was predominant in educational materials and in mass media broadcasts. In contrast, Taiwanese identity was

TABLE 2.6. National Identity of Respondents

National Identity[a]	North	South	All Respondents
Strong Chinese Identity	**27.87%**	14.01%	20.71%
Chinese Identity	**17.06%**	14.01%	14.72%
Dual Identity[b]	33.95%	33.19%	35.81%
Taiwanese Identity	14.02%	**23.28%**	18.29%
Strong Taiwanese Identity	7.09%	**15.52%**	10.47%
Total	592	464	1,318

Source: Chen (2001).
[a] Question: "Which ethnic group do you think you belong to, Chinese or Taiwanese?"
[b] Answer: "I am a Taiwanese and a Chinese."

repressed because it would otherwise suggest a different type of nationalism based on multiculturalism. In the early 1990s, national identity soon became one of the most salient issues in Taiwanese politics (Rigger 1997).

As we see in table 2.6, the proportion of Chinese identity is much higher in the north. Almost 35 percent of the respondents in the north identified as Chinese (regardless of intensity). In contrast, only 21 percent identified as Taiwanese. But once we look in the south, the pattern flips: While 28 percent identified as Chinese, almost 40 percent saw themselves as Taiwanese. Interestingly, the proportion of those who saw themselves as both Chinese *and* Taiwanese remained constant between the two regions (about 33%).

Of course, one possible explanation for this regional discrepancy has to do with the *waishengren* in the north. They are, after all, recent migrants—or children of recent migrants—from China. As such, their affinity for identifying as Chinese is to be expected. To address this possibility, we isolate the sample for only the Hokkiens. As we see in table 2.7, the results remain largely unchanged: The Taiwanese identity is much strong in the south, where 42 percent of the respondents identified as Taiwanese. In contrast, in the north, only 28 percent answered in the same way. These differences are consistent with Wachman's (1994) argument that "one source of frustration that resulted from KMT cultural policies and continually reinforced the Taiwanese sense of group identity is the issue of dialects" (107). In the north, where Mandarin functioned much like a lingua franca, the frustration was less prominent; but conversely, in the south, where Hokkien was *the* language of the supermajority, these restrictions would feed into a non-Chinese identity.

TABLE 2.7. National Identity of Respondents (Hokkien Sample)

National Identity[a]	North	South	All Respondents
Strong Chinese Identity	**12.68%**	10.11%	12.14%
Chinese Identity	**17.70%**	13.83%	14.18%
Dual Identity[b]	40.41%	33.51%	38.67%
Taiwanese Identity	20.35%	**25.53%**	22.45%
Strong Taiwanese Identity	8.85%	**17.02%**	12.57%
Total	339	376	931

Source: Chen (2001).
[a] Question: "Which ethnic group do you think you belong to, Chinese or Taiwanese?"
[b] Answer: "I am a Taiwanese and a Chinese."

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how the causal process leading to Hokkien recognition differed between the north and the south. Using archived survey data and process tracing, we showed that in the north, demographic shifts pushed the KMT away from repressive monolingualism. And in the south, democratization allowed the *benshengren* members to pull the KMT toward Hokkien recognition. By calling attention to the north-south divide, this chapter makes two contributions. The first is to Asian studies. This chapter highlights how the concentration of one group in one area provided a social and electoral base for shaping the political landscape—a legacy that we still see in the present day. The second contribution is to the field of ethnic politics. By highlighting the nuanced relationship between language, ancestral origins, and geographical region, this chapter highlights the importance of focusing on cross-cutting cleavages and subethnic fractionalization (Selway 2011, 2015).

In this chapter, the focus has been on the Hokkiens. On the one hand, this attention is warranted. It is a critical case (see Seawright and Gering 2008). The Hokkiens are the numerical majority. And during KMT's authoritarian rule, the domination of the minority *waishengren* over the majority Hokkiens rendered Taiwan one of the two cases in Asia where we see such a linguistic configuration (Liu 2015). On the other hand, because of the highly unusual situation, perhaps the attention should not be on the Hokkiens but on the other languages. There is another Chinese vernacular–speaking *benshengren* population in Taiwan. The Hakkas are from Guangdong (also in southern China), and their ancestors also migrated to Taiwan prior to Japanese colonialization. In many ways, the

Hakkas were subjected to two rounds of domination—a political one by the *waishengren* and then a numerical one by the Hokkiens (see Dupré 2017). The Hakkas are concentrated in northern Taiwan, specifically in Hsinchu.

The population on the island, however, is more than just Han Chinese. There are also the aborigines. There is archeological evidence to suggest that they are not only indigenous to the island but also related to many of the aborigine tribes in the Pacific islands. During the KMT rule, they too were subjected to the same assimilative policies (Kaplan and Baldauf 2003). And while the Taiwanese government's rhetoric today—in an area of multiculturalism—talks about these four "ethnic" groups (note that the focus has shifted from subethnic to ethnic), there is another distinct fifth group that is socially but not yet politically relevant: the "new residents" from Southeast Asia (Chen 2014; Cheng 2014; Wang, Chen, and Tang 2014). As their numbers continue to grow—especially in the south—it will be important to see how regionalism affects their recognition.