Do member states' permanent representations matter for their bargaining success? Evidence from the EU Council of Ministers

Arregui, Javier; Perarnaud, Clément

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1991981

Do member states' permanent representations matter for their bargaining success? Evidence from the EU Council of Ministers

Citation

Arregui J, Perarnaud C. Do member states' permanent representations matter for their bargaining success? Evidence from the EU Council of Ministers. J Eur Public Policy. 2021;29(1):97-116. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1991981

Abstract

How can differences in Member States (MS) capacities to coordinate European Union (EU) decision-making processes influence their bargaining success? Based on a new dataset collected with Council representatives and policy experts in Brussels, this research shows how informal MS capacities can partly shape legislative outcomes in the EU under certain conditions. This research provides evidence that informal capacities, such as the effectiveness of MS permanent representations and/or their capacity to coordinate with other actors in the legislative decision-making, matter for bargaining success. Using a mixed-method design, this research illustrates how both the structure preference allocation and thresholds of formal power are conditions of informal power resource activation.