Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Duque, Gabriel
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:21Z 2017-07-26T10:50:21Z 1998-03-01
dc.description.abstract I study the relation between the delay in the transmission of spillovers of information and diffusion. When a firm enters or innovates it benefits from the information it gets by observing past entry. Delays in the process of receiving the information reduce the benefits of the spillover and affect the entry process. I derive the effects this delay has on diffusion, on the dynamics of price and cost of entry, and on efficiency. I explain why, when spillovers of information are delayed, a zero profit condition requires an initial set of entrants bigger than zero. I also illustrate how an S-shaped diffusion curve can be generated. I show that competitive equilibrium entails a slower generation of information relative to the social optimum and how a social planner can improve efficiency.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 285
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Diffusion with delayed informational spillovers
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:03:35Z
dc.subject.keyword diffusion
dc.subject.keyword informational spillovers
dc.subject.keyword delays
dc.subject.keyword innovation
dc.subject.keyword entry
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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