Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Hauk, Esther
dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaak
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
dc.date.issued 1999-07-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=408
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Number 1, September 2002, pp. 66-90(25)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/737
dc.description.abstract We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 408
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:04:46Z
dc.subject.keyword forward induction
dc.subject.keyword strategic stability
dc.subject.keyword ees sets
dc.subject.keyword index theory
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search


My Account


In collaboration with Compliant to Partaking