Mostra el registre parcial de l'element
dc.contributor.author | Garoupa, Nuno |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-26T10:50:19Z |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-26T10:50:19Z |
dc.date.issued | 2000-11-01 |
dc.identifier | https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=529 |
dc.identifier.citation | Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 6, (2000), pp.243-252 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/725 |
dc.description.abstract | Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 529 |
dc.rights | L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title | Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified | 2017-07-23T02:05:58Z |
dc.subject.keyword | law enforcement |
dc.subject.keyword | corporation |
dc.subject.keyword | Business Economics and Industrial Organization |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |