Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic
theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?
Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing
corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should
corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major
contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical
framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.
In second ...
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic
theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?
Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing
corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should
corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major
contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical
framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.
In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights
into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by
their employees.
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