Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Garoupa, Nuno
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2000-04-01
dc.identifier.citation European Economic Review, 45, 9, (2001) pp. 1765-1771
dc.description.abstract The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 454
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Optimal magnitude and probability of fines
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:05:12Z
dc.subject.keyword crime
dc.subject.keyword probability and severity of sanctions
dc.subject.keyword law enforcement
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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