International compliance mechanisms are crucial to the effectiveness of international environmental treaties: instances of non-compliance not only undermine directly the goals of such agreements but, equally important, also erode the trust necessary to promote participation and ambition. This dissertation examines and assesses the Paris Agreement Compliance Committee (PAICC), a mechanism established in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement to ‘facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with ...
International compliance mechanisms are crucial to the effectiveness of international environmental treaties: instances of non-compliance not only undermine directly the goals of such agreements but, equally important, also erode the trust necessary to promote participation and ambition. This dissertation examines and assesses the Paris Agreement Compliance Committee (PAICC), a mechanism established in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement to ‘facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with [its] provisions’. The PAICC builds on the experience of previous compliance mechanisms – in particular, the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee –, and responds to the bottom-up nature of the Agreement. This analysis observes, however, that, in its current design, the Committee faces significant limitations in addressing cases of non-compliance with legally binding procedural obligations in the Agreement – including lack of enforcement powers and narrow grounds for action. Nonetheless, this assessment also suggests that facilitative action could become the central strength of the Committee.
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