Many sanctions regimes include bans on trade in natural resources (e.g., the US oil embargo on Venezuela, Iran, or Russia or Western sanctions on timber from Myanmar). Sanctions on various commodities have an “extraterritorial effect” and force third parties in public and private sectors to adapt their business strategies and behavior to multiple compliance requirements. Moreover, sanctions also indirectly affect third parties though commodity market mechanisms (e.g., price fluctuations, disruptions ...
Many sanctions regimes include bans on trade in natural resources (e.g., the US oil embargo on Venezuela, Iran, or Russia or Western sanctions on timber from Myanmar). Sanctions on various commodities have an “extraterritorial effect” and force third parties in public and private sectors to adapt their business strategies and behavior to multiple compliance requirements. Moreover, sanctions also indirectly affect third parties though commodity market mechanisms (e.g., price fluctuations, disruptions in supplies, financial risks, and uncertainties). The chapter discusses how third actors react to commodity sanctions. First, it provides a brief overview of past and present commodity sanctions. Then, it illustrates how third states can support the sanctions, maintain a neutral position, or proactively try to sabotage them. Similarly, companies can decide to either follow or ignore these sanctions regimes. As the chapter shows, the behavior of the government and businesses in third countries are not always the same. Third actors, therefore, should not be seen as monolithic blocks in research on sanctions.
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