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Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

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dc.contributor.author Hauk, Esther
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:50Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:50Z
dc.date.issued 1999-04-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=391
dc.identifier.citation Theory and Decision, Volume 54, Number 3, May 2003, pp. 207-229(23)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/618
dc.description.abstract Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside option reveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 391
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:04:36Z
dc.subject.keyword prisoner's dilemma
dc.subject.keyword cooperation
dc.subject.keyword exit
dc.subject.keyword experiments
dc.subject.keyword loss aversion
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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