One may not only represent the same objects of one’s past, but also represent them as the same objects across time. I call this phenomenon “Remembering as the Same” (RaS). In this article, I aim to bring out the connection between the simulationist model of cognitive memory and this underexplored aspect of memory experience. I shall suggest that, unlike the causalist contender, the simulationist is in an advantageous position to properly capture RaS, especially when subjects represent past objects ...
One may not only represent the same objects of one’s past, but also represent them as the same objects across time. I call this phenomenon “Remembering as the Same” (RaS). In this article, I aim to bring out the connection between the simulationist model of cognitive memory and this underexplored aspect of memory experience. I shall suggest that, unlike the causalist contender, the simulationist is in an advantageous position to properly capture RaS, especially when subjects represent past objects as the same in cross-temporal trains of thought that are also future-oriented. In the course of defending this claim, I will highlight the significance of RaS in the study of memory and cross-temporal reference, critically examine the resources available to causalist approaches, and reject too simplistic incorporations of RaS within the simulationist framework.
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