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dc.contributor.author Banal Estañol, Albert
dc.contributor.author Seldeslachts, Jo
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:59Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:59Z
dc.date.issued 2009-06-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1192
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/6054
dc.description.abstract This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partner to make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are more likely to fail.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1192
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Merger failures
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:12:57Z
dc.subject.keyword mergers
dc.subject.keyword synergies
dc.subject.keyword asymmetric information
dc.subject.keyword complementarities
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.subject.keyword Finance and Accounting
dc.subject.keyword Operations Management
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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