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Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises

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dc.contributor.author Vladasel, Theodor
dc.contributor.author Parker, Simon C.
dc.contributor.author Sloof, Randolph
dc.contributor.author van Praag, Mirjam
dc.date.accessioned 2024-05-16T07:45:16Z
dc.date.available 2024-05-16T07:45:16Z
dc.date.issued 2024
dc.identifier.citation Vladasel T, Parker SC, Sloof R, van Praag M. Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises. J Econ Manag Strategy. 2024 Mar 21. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12590
dc.identifier.issn 1058-6407
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60171
dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 21-03-2024
dc.description Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.
dc.description.abstract Revenue drift, whereby insufficient attention is given to economic, relative to social, goals, threatens social enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee attention to commercial tasks and attracting workers less inclined to fixate on social tasks. In an online experiment with varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining monetary rewards with a social mission not only attract more workers but are also able to guard against revenue drift.
dc.description.sponsorship We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Mærsk‐McKinney‐Møller Chair in Entrepreneurship at Copenhagen Business School; Vladasel also acknowledges support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (BSE CEX2019‐000915‐S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Part of this research was carried out while Vladasel was a Fox International Fellow at Yale.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of economics & management strategy. 2024 Mar 21
dc.rights © 2024 The Authors. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.other Incentius (Economia)
dc.subject.other Incentius laborals
dc.subject.other Empreses -- Responsabilitat social
dc.title Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12590
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/CEX2019‐000915‐S
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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