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dc.contributor.author Aragonés, Enriqueta
dc.contributor.author Postlewaite, Andrew
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:45Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:45Z
dc.date.issued 2000-09-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=525
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/570
dc.description.abstract We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 525
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:56Z
dc.subject.keyword electoral campaigns
dc.subject.keyword reputation
dc.subject.keyword commitment
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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