During the so-called “refugee crisis”, when the Dublin system of refugee allocation failed, the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to establish a legislative framework for solidarity-based relocation. By proposing legal flexibility in its initiative for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management, the new von der Leyen Commission has resurrected the issue and brought it back on the legislative agenda. However, it appears to be counterintuitive that the Commission has proposed this regulation ...
During the so-called “refugee crisis”, when the Dublin system of refugee allocation failed, the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to establish a legislative framework for solidarity-based relocation. By proposing legal flexibility in its initiative for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management, the new von der Leyen Commission has resurrected the issue and brought it back on the legislative agenda. However, it appears to be counterintuitive that the Commission has proposed this regulation as it would constitute a dis-integrative step departing from policymaking through robust and uniform legal arrangements. But why did the Commission nevertheless decide to initiate such a proposal? This puzzle will be addressed in this research by applying a novel perspective that attempts to explain the Commission’s motivations in light of dis-integration and compliance research applied to the Commission’s peculiarities. Its considerations will be examined through a qualitative content analysis. The findings suggest that the Commission sees controlled dis-integration as the lesser evil and that it is heavily constraint by the interests of other actors giving much importance to a vocal minority against uniform relocation legislations.
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