Benvinguts al Repositori Digital de la UPF

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Hart, Sergiu Mas-Colell, Andreu
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z 1996-03-01
dc.identifier.citation Econometrica, 68, 5, (2000), pp. 1127-1150,
dc.description.abstract We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive procedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 200
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:02:53Z
dc.subject.keyword correlated equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword nash equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword adaptive prodedure
dc.subject.keyword regret
dc.subject.keyword blackwell approachability
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Aquest element apareix en la col·lecció o col·leccions següent(s)

Mostra el registre parcial de l'element