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Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Jeon, Doh-Shin Menicucci, Domenico
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:08Z 2017-07-26T10:50:08Z 2009-02-01
dc.description.abstract We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1152
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:12:29Z
dc.subject.keyword bundling
dc.subject.keyword portfolios
dc.subject.keyword slots (or shelf space)
dc.subject.keyword pure bundling
dc.subject.keyword slotting contracts
dc.subject.keyword exclusive dealing
dc.subject.keyword foreclosure
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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