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dc.contributor.author Galbiati, Roberto
dc.contributor.author Schlag, Karl
dc.contributor.author van der Weele, Joël
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:16Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:16Z
dc.date.issued 2009-03-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1150
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4791
dc.description.abstract We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game in the presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effort choices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in the second round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This is not true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choice of a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the first round to be less optimistic.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1150
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:12:28Z
dc.subject.keyword sanctions
dc.subject.keyword beliefs
dc.subject.keyword expressive law
dc.subject.keyword deterrence
dc.subject.keyword coordination
dc.subject.keyword minimum effort game
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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