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Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

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dc.contributor.author Villanova, Ramon
dc.contributor.author Paradís, Jaume
dc.contributor.author Viader Canals, Pelegrí
dc.contributor.author Miralles, Joan
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:18Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:18Z
dc.date.issued 2002-10-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=646
dc.identifier.citation Keio Economic Studies, 48, 69-96, 2012
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/477
dc.description.abstract It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability is proved false.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 646
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:07:14Z
dc.subject.keyword cournot equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword non-cooperative oligopoly
dc.subject.keyword quasi-competitiveness
dc.subject.keyword stability
dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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