It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical
Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,
in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium.
In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable
unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists
as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion
that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability
is ...
It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical
Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,
in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium.
In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable
unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists
as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion
that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability
is proved false.
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